The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
The counterpart to the riddle in this sphere of comparative art, where
the point of departure is from the generality of the significance,
is the _allegory._ From a certain point of view this form, no less
than the former, endeavours to make more visible to us the definite
qualities of a general conception through qualities in materially
concrete objects which are cognate therewith; but in contrast to that
form this is not done in the interest of a partial concealment and
a mysterious problem; rather it is now quite the other way with the
express object of absolute revealment; to an extent, in fact, that all
which is external, and is as such utilized by it, must become through
and through transpicuous with the significance which has to make its
appearance therein.
(_a_) It is therefore in the first place concerned to personify
abstract conditions of a general character or similar qualities
both from the human and the natural world, such as religion, love,
justice, strife, fame, war, peace, the seasons, death, and the like,
and conceive them under the mode of _personality._ This subjective
aspect, however, is neither in respect to its content nor its external
form in itself either a real subject or individual, but persists as
the abstraction of a general conception, whose content is merely
the _barren_ form of subjectivity which may be called as truly a
grammatical subject[90]. In other words an allegorical being, despite
every attempt to clothe it in the lineaments of humanity, entirely
falls short of concrete individuality, whether it be a Greek god, a
saint, or any other genuine example. It is, in fact, so forced to
pare away[91] from the substance of subjectivity, in order to make it
conform with the abstract character of its significance, that all
the true definition of individuality disappears. It is therefore only
a just criticism of allegory to say that it is frosty and cold, and,
having regard to the abstract quality of its significances, even in the
point of invention, that it is rather the result of the matter-of-fact
understanding than that of the complete vision and emotional depth
of genuine imagination. Poets, such as Virgil, for example, are
particularly ready to give us examples of allegorical individualization
simply because they are unable to create gods of the Homeric type of
personality.