The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_c_) In this way the allegory is under both these aspects without
vital warmth. Its general personification is empty, the definite mode
of its externalization is only a sign, which taken independently has
no longer any meaning, and the _centrum_, which is thus constrained to
gather up the variety of the attributes into a focus does not possess
the potency of a truly subjective unity which is itself self-embodied
in its real and determinate existence inter-related throughout, but is
rather a purely abstract form, for which the substantial filling-up
with particular traits, which, as we have seen, never succeed in rising
above the rank of the formal attribute, remains as something external.
Consequently we may say that in so far as the allegory sets up any
claim to real self-consistency, in which it personifies its abstraction
and their delineation, it is not to be taken seriously. In other
words, that which is both implicitly and explicitly self-substantive
is unable really to conform with an allegorical being. The _Dikê_
of the ancients, for instance, is not on all fours with allegorical
individualization. She is universal Necessity personified, eternal
Justice, the universally potent subject, the absolute substantivity of
the relations which co-ordinate Nature and spiritual Life, that is, she
is the absolute Self-subsistent itself, in the train of whom all other
individuals are bound, whether gods or men. Herr Frederick von Schlegel
has, it is true--we have already referred to the fact--ventured the
opinion that every work of art must of necessity be an allegory. Such
an expression of opinion is only true if limited to the sense that
every work of art must contain a general idea and a significance which
is itself essentially true. What we have above, on the contrary,
included under the term allegory is a mode of presentation which only
conforms to the notion of art incompletely, being itself no less
in content than in form subordinate to it. Every human event and
development, every relation in which life is concerned, possesses no
doubt intrinsically an aspect of universality, which may be emphasized
as such, but abstractions of this kind are already to be found in the
general contents of consciousness, and merely to assert them in their
prosaic aspect of generality and external delineation, which is the
point where the allegory halts, is still to fall short of the true
sphere of art.
Winckelmann has also written an immature work on allegory, in which he
has ranged together a large number of examples, but failed for the
most part to distinguish those which exemplify the symbol and allegory
respectively.