The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
The conception we have in general terms formed of the symbolic type
of art is such that within it significance and expression are unable
to unite sufficiently to appear in complete and reciprocal fusion.
In unconscious symbolism the _incompatibility_ of these two aspects
remained a fact throughout, if not actually _declared_ as such; in the
Sublime on the contrary this inadequacy was _explicitly_ asserted:
the absolute significance, God, no less than His external reality,
the world, are expressly represented in this excluding relation to
one another. On the other hand, however, in all these types that
further aspect of symbolism, namely, the _affinity_ which obtains
between the significance and the external form, in which it is visibly
manifested, still retained its importance. In the original type of
symbolism this was exclusively the case, a type which did not as yet
set forth the significance in contrast to its concrete existence.
But in the Sublime, too, it remained an _essential_ relation, a type
which, in order to express the Supreme Being, if here under a wholly
inadequate mode, required as its means the phenomena of Nature, and the
events and exploits of God's chosen people. And finally it reappears
in the comparative type of art a personal relation and one that is
consequently amenable to _caprice._ This element of caprice, however,
albeit it is an entirely present fact and particularly so in the case
of the metaphor, image, and simile, is notwithstanding still hidden
away behind the _affinity_ between the significance and the image
utilized to express it, in so far as it selects the comparison simply
out of a regard for their mutual resemblance, a fundamental aspect of
which is not so much the _external_ form as just this _relation_ set up
between them by the activity of the soul and consisting in subjective
emotions, points of view and ideas and their cognate modes of
configuration[118]. When, however, it is not the notion of the material
itself, but simply a capricious use of the judgment, which brings
together the content and its artistic form, both can only be conceived
as posited in an entirely external relation to one another; their
association is now a juxtaposition without essential relation, simply
a dressing up, that is to say, of the one side by the other. For this
reason we have here to treat these last-mentioned and subordinate types
of art by way of supplement. They arise from the absolute collapse of
the essential phases in all true art-production; they bring before us,
in short, by their independence of the principle of relativity the
suicide of the symbolic type.