The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
misfortune and overthrow of other nations, and not unfrequently find
the main strength of their utterance in curses and imprecations.
No doubt the elements of true beauty and art are presented to each of
these points of view above noticed; but they are in the first instance
brought together in haphazard and confused fashion, and are set in a
false relation to each other, instead of being referred to a genuine
principle of identity. For this reason the purely ideal and abstract
unity of the Divine is unable to bring forth any entirely adequate
art-product in the form that is characterized by real individuality;
and at the same time Nature and human individuality either are
manifestly not, whether we consider their inward principle, or their
external mode of appearance, permeated by the Absolute, or at least
not positively pervaded by it. This _externality_ of significance,
which is thus made the essential content, and the determinate mode of
appearance under which it is generally reproduced is finally and in the
_third_ place exemplified in the _comparative activity_ of art[128].
In this type both sides have become wholly independent, and the unity
that binds them together is merely the invisible subjectivity which
compares. For this very reason that which is defective in such an
external presentment returned in ever more emphatic degree and betrayed
itself as that which was for the genuine art representation merely
negative or, rather, entirely subversive. And when this dissolution is
really effected the significance can no longer remain the inherently
_abstract_ ideal, but the inherently determinate and self-defined
ideal principle, which in this its concrete totality possesses quite
as essentially the other aspect thereof, that is, the form of an
inherently exclusive and determinate appearance; and consequently in
its external existence, as that which is its very own, merely expresses
and signifies itself.