The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
Classical art and its religion of beauty
does not consequently wholly satisfy the depths of Spirit. However
essentially concrete it may be, it still remains abstract for humanity
because, instead of movement and reconciliation obtained by the
contradiction we have adverted to of that infinite subjective process,
it merely possesses as its life that undisturbed harmony of the free
individuality determined in its adequate existence, this repose in its
reality, this happiness, this content and greatness in itself, this
eternal blitheness and bliss which even in unhappiness and pain does
not lose its secure reliance on itself. Classical art has not worked
its way to the full contradiction which is fundamentally involved in
the notion of the Absolute and overcome that contradiction. For this
reason it does not recognize the aspect which is in close relation
to this contradiction, that is the essential obduracy of the subject
as opposed to that which is ethical and of absolute significance,
namely, sin and evil, no less than the waste of individual life in its
own subjective aims, the dissolution and incontinence of that world
which we may summarily describe as that of the entire sphere of its
divisions, which is productive on the side both of sense and spirit of
distortion, ugliness, and the repulsive. Classical art fails to cross
the pure territory of the genuine Ideal.
2. In so far as the _historical_ realization of classical art is
concerned, it is hardly necessary to observe that we must seek for
that among the Greeks. Classical beauty, with its infinite range of
content, material and form, is the gift bestowed on the Greek people;
and this folk is entitled to our respect on the ground that it has
produced art in its highest form of vitality. The Greeks, if we regard
the form of their realized life immediately presented us, lived in
that happy middle sphere of self-conscious and subjective freedom and
substantive ethical life. They did not persist, on the one hand, in the
unfree Oriental unity, which is necessarily bound up with a religious
and political despotism for the reason that the individuality of the
subject is overwhelmed in a universal substance, or, in some particular
aspect of the same, because it has essentially as personality no
right, and consequently no ground to stand on; neither, on the other,
did they pass beyond to that subjective penetration, in which the
particular subject separates itself from the whole and the universal,
in order to make itself more explicit in its ideality; and only through
a higher return to the ideal totality of a purely spiritual world,
succeeds in its final purification of the substantive and essential.
On the contrary, in the ethical life of Greece, the individual was
self-substantive and essentially free, without disengaging himself
from the general interests of the realized State immediately visible
to him and the positive immanence of spiritual freedom in the temporal
condition.