The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
In a similar way we may, to linger once more for a moment by the
illustrations we adduced on a former page, recall again to our readers
the "Eumenides" of Aeschylus. The conflict between Apollo and the
Eumenides is to be settled by the intervention of the Areopagus. In
other words, a human tribunal, as a whole, at whose head stands Athene,
stands forth as the concrete spirit of the folk, and is as such to
terminate the collision. The judges, however, give an equal number of
votes for condemnation and acquittal, having an equal reverence both
for the Eumenides and Apollo; the white pebble of Athene, however,
decides the conflict in favour of Apollo. The Eumenides break out in
indignation against this decision of Athene; she, however, allays
their wrath by promising them worship and altars in the famous grove
of Colonos. What the Eumenides have to give in return to her people
is a protection against the evils[176] which result from the elements
of _Nature_, the earth, the heavens, the sea, and the winds; they
have further to ward off unfruitfulness in the fields, the failure of
living seed, and misbirths in all else that is procreated. Pallas, on
her part, takes beneath her protection the strife of wars and sacred
contests. Ina similar way Sophocles[177], in his "Antigone," not only
makes Antigone suffer and die, but to a like extent we find that Kreon
is punished by the loss of his wife and the death of Haemon, both of
whom perish through the death of Antigone.
(_c_) _Thirdly_, the ancient gods do not merely preserve their place
in juxtaposition to the new, but, what is of more importance, the
natural basis itself is maintained by the new gods, and receives,
continuing to made its echo sound in them, if in conformity with the
spiritual individuality of classical art, a reverential acceptance.
(_α_) And for this reason people are not unfrequently led into the
error of conceiving the Greek gods, in respect to their human character
and form, as mere _allegories_ of such natural elements. This is not
so. In this sense we frequently hear it stated that Helios is the
god of the sun, Diana the goddess of the moon, or Neptune the god of
the sea. Such a separation, however, between the natural element, as
content, and the humanly shaped personification, as form, no less than
the external association of both, regarded merely as the masterdom of
the god over the natural fact, as we are accustomed to it in the Old
Testament, is quite inapplicable to Greek conceptions. We never find
among the Greeks such an expression as ὁ θεὸς τoῦ ἡλίoυ, τῆς θαλάσσης,
and so forth, though it is quite certain they would have used with
others such an expression for the relation in question, had it been
compatible with their point of view. Helios is the sun as god.