The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_α_) For this reason the plastic Ideal is unable to present itself
as infinite self-conscious spirituality. These plastic shapes of
beauty are not merely stone and bronze, but also the infinite form of
subjective life vanishes from them in their content and expression.
We may become as enthusiastic as we please over their beauty and art,
but for all that our _enthusiasm_ is and remains something native
to our own souls; it is not really at home in the objects which it
thus contemplates, that is in the gods themselves. To complete the
true totality a real reciprocity is required on this side also of the
subjective, self-knowing unity and infinity; it is this, and only this,
that unfolds our conception of a living God of knowledge, and of men
who thus apprehend Him. If this totality is not also essentially and
with adequacy conformable to the content and nature of the Absolute,
then the Absolute will itself appear not as truly a subject of
spiritual being, and its presentment will confront us merely in its
objective form without the possession of self-conscious Spirit. It is
quite true, no doubt, that the individuality of the gods retains the
content of subjectivity, but merely under modes that are contingent,
and in a process of development,' which moves independently outside
that substantive repose and blessedness of the gods.
(_β_) On the other hand, the subjectivity which is opposed to the
gods of plastic art is also not the form of conscious life which is
essentially eternal and true. In other words, this latter is--as we
shall see for ourselves more clearly in our consideration of the third
type of art, the romantic--that which has before it the objectivity to
which it is conformable under the mode of an essentially infinite and
self-knowing God. Inasmuch, however, as the knowing subject, at the
stage we are now discussing, does not consciously conceive itself as
present in the perfections of these godlike figures, nor even in its
contemplation of such objects is aware of itself as circumstantially
objective, it is still wholly distinct and separate from its absolute
object, and is consequently a purely contingent and finite subjectivity.