The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_b_) Together with this way of looking at the relation in contrast
to that of symbolic art we may add that the _content_ of both sides
is altered, as they now stand in opposition. To put it thus we may
say that, in the symbolic type of art, it is abstractions more or
less, general thoughts, or at least definite phrases in the form of
generalities peculiar to reflective thought, which, by means of the
symbolic type of art, receive a sensuous embodiment replete with
suggestion. In the form, however, which makes itself predominant in
this transition to romantic art the content, it is true, is made up
of a similar abstraction of general thoughts, opinions, and maxims of
reflective reason, but in this case it is not these abstractions in
themselves, but rather their presence in the _individual's_ mind and
his self-subsistent identity which furnish the content for one side of
the opposition. For the primary requirement of this mediating stage
consists in this, that the spiritual which has attained the Ideal,
shall stand forth in its entire independence. Already in classical
art we found that spiritual individuality was of chief importance,
albeit on the side of its realization it remained reconciled with a
determinate existence as immediately presented. What is of importance
now is to declare a mode of subjectivity which strives to acquire the
mastery over the form that is no longer adequate to it, in a word, over
external reality. In this way the world of Spirit becomes liberated as
independent. It recovers itself from bondage to the sensuous material
and manifests itself thereby through this return upon its own resources
as the subject of a self-consciousness which only finds contentment
in the secret wealth of its own domain. This subject, however, which
repels externality from itself, is not in respect to its ideal aspect
yet the truly concrete totality which encloses as content the Absolute
under the mode of self-conscious spiritual life; rather it is, as still
fettered by its opposition to reality, a purely abstract, finite,
and unsatisfied form of subjectivity. In opposition to this we have
confronting it an equally finite mode of reality, which on its part is
also independent, but just for that very reason--forasmuch, that is,
as the truth of Spirit has withdrawn from it into its own ideality and
henceforward neither will nor can identity itself with it, appears as
a reality void of all gods and an existence fallen into rottenness. In
this manner and at this point art brings forward a Spirit that thinks,
that is, to repeat our former analysis, the individual consciousness
of our humanity, which, supporting itself on its own possession of the
abstract knowledge and volition of goodness and virtue, confronts
with hostility therewith the corruption of its present environment.
That aspect of this opposition which remains unresolved, and in which
the ideal and external modes of its antithesis persist in their