The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_b_) However much, we must fain add, this identification asserts
itself as grounded in the essence of the Absolute itself, as spiritual
freedom and infinity it is no reconciliation which immediately is
visible from the first in either the real worlds of Nature or Spirit;
on the contrary, it is only accomplished as the elevation of Spirit
from the finitude of its immediate existence to its truth. As a
corollary of this it follows that Spirit, in order to secure its
totality and freedom, must effect an act of self-severation, and set
up on the one side itself as the finitude of Nature and Spirit to
its opposed self on the other as that which is essentially infinite.
Conversely with this act of disruption the necessity is conjoined
that from out of this retirement from its unity--within the bounds of
which the finite and purely natural, the immediacy of existence, the
"natural" heart in the sense of the negative, evil and bad, one and
all are defined--a way is at last found by virtue of the subjugation
of all that has no substantive worth within the kingdom of truth and
consolation. In this wise the reconcilement of Spirit can only be
conceived as an activity, a movement of the same, can only be presented
as a process, in whose course arise both strain and conflict, and
the appearance and reappearance, as an essential feature of it, of
pain, death, the mournful sense of non-reality, the agony of the
soul and its bodily tenement. For just as God in the first instance
disparts finite reality from Himself, so, too, finite man, who starts
on his journey outside the divine kingdom, receives the task to exalt
himself to God, to let loose from him the finite, to do away with the
nothing-worth, and by means of this decease of his immediate reality
to become that which God in His manifestation as man accomplished as
very truth in the actual world. The infinite pain of this sacrifice of
the most personal subjectivity, sufferings, and death, which for the
most part were excluded from the representation of classical art, or
rather only are presented there as natural suffering, receive their
adequate treatment necessarily for the first time in romantic art.
It is, for example, impossible to affirm that among the Greeks death
was ever conceived in its full and essential significance. Neither
that which was purely natural, nor the immediacy of Spirit in its
union with the bodily presence, was held by the Greeks as something
in itself essentially negative. Death was consequently to them purely
an abstract passing over, unaccompanied by horror or fearsomeness, a
cessation without further immeasurable consequences for the deceased.
If, however, conscious life in its spiritual self-possession is of
infinite worth then the negation, which death enfolds, is a negation
of this exaltation and worth, and it is consequently fearful, a death
of the soul, which is in the position of finding itself thereby
as itself now this negative in explicit appearance, excluded for