The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_a_) For, first, as we have already indicated, Nature is divested of
the Divine principle; in other words, the sea and mountains, valleys,
Time, and Night, briefly all the general processes of Nature, have
here lost the worth which they carry when related to the presentation
and content of the Absolute. The images of Nature receive no further
expansion in a symbolic significance. The thesis that their shapes and
activities might possibly sustain traits of Divine import is taken away
from them. For all the mighty questions in regard to the origin of the
world, in regard to the Whence, Wherefore, and Whither, of created
Nature and humanity, and all the symbolical and plastic experiments
in the resolution and exposition of these problems disappear at once
in the revelation of God in Spirit; and we may add that also in the
spiritual sphere the world of variety and colour, with the characters,
actions, and events, as they were envisaged by classical art, are now
concentrated in _one_ single _light-focus_ of the Absolute and its
eternal history of redemption. The whole content meets, therefore, at
this single point of the Inmost of Spirit[220]--that is, of feeling,
imagination, soul--all that strains after a union with truth, that
seeks and wrestles to bring to birth the Divine in consciousness, and
to maintain it; and, furthermore, is constrained to execute the world's
aims and undertakings, not so much for the _world's_ sake as to further
the unique and essential undertaking of its heart by means of the
spiritual conflict of man's inward nature and his reconciliation with
God, presenting personality and its conservation no less than all that
paves the way to them for this object, and this alone. The heroism,
which makes its appearance as the result of such aspirations, is not
the kind of heroism which prescribes laws by its own fiat, establishes
new systems, creates and informs circumstances, but rather a heroism
of submission, which accepts everything as predetermined and ordered
above it, and whose energies are now wholly restricted to the task of
regulating temporal events in line with such direction, and making
that which is in keeping with the higher order and of independent
stability a valid factor in the world as if is and in the Time-process.
For the reason, however, that this absolute content appears as
concentrated to a focus in the inward _life of the soul_, and the
entire process is imported into the life of mankind, the range of this
content is thereby also infinitely extended. It _expands_, in fact,
to a manifold variety practically without limit. For although every
objective history supplies what is substantive in that self-concrete
soul-life, yet for all that the subject of the same reviews it in all
its aspects, presents isolated features taken from it, or unfolds it
as it appears in continually novel human traits by way of addition,
and may very well into the bargain both import the entire expanse of