The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
Inasmuch as romantic art, in the representation of the consciousness
of absolute subjectivity, understanding this as the comprehension of
all truth, the coalescence of mind with its essence--receives its
substantive content in the satisfaction of soul-life, in other words
the reconciliation of God with the world and therein with Himself, it
follows that at this stage the Ideal for the first time is completely
at home. For it was blessedness and self-subsistency, contentment,
repose, and freedom which we declared as most fundamentally defining
the Ideal. Of course, we cannot therefore on this account deduce
the Ideal simply from the notion and reality of romantic art; but
relatively to the classic Ideal the form it receives is entirely
altered. This relation, already in general terms indicated, we must now
before everything else establish in its fully concrete significance,
in order to elucidate the fundamental type of the romantic mode of
presentation. In the classical Ideal the Divine is in one aspect of
it restricted to pure individuality; in another aspect the soul and
spiritual blessedness of particular gods find their exclusive discharge
through the physical medium; and as a third characteristic, for the
reason that the inseparable unity of each individual both essentially
and in its exterior form supplies the principle of the same, the
negativity of the dismemberment implied in human life, that is the
pain of both body and soul, sacrifice, and resignation are unable to
appear as essentially pertinent to these godlike figures. The Divine
of classical art falls, it is true, into an aggregation of gods,
but there is no organic and essential self-division, no universally
proclaimed essence such as we find in the particular presentment of
man whether in form and spirit, whether empirically or subjectively
considered; and just as little has it confronting it, as being itself
the Absolute in invisible form, a world of evil, sin, and ignorance,
together with the task of resolving such contradictions in harmony, and
only by thus growing on level terms with the very truth and divine out
of this reconciliation. In the notion of the absolute subjectivity,
on the contrary, this opposition between substantive universality and
personality is inherent, an opposition, whose consummated mediation
the subjective ideality perfects with its substance, exalting thereby
the substantive presence to the articulate and absolute subject of
self-knowledge and volition. But there is, _secondly_, appertinent
to the reality of the subjective condition conceived as mind the
profounder contradiction of a finite world, through whose abrogation
as finite, and by whose resultant reconciliation with the Absolute
the Infinite by virtue of its own absolute activity makes its proper
being self-subsistent, and so for the first time exists as absolute
Spirit. The appearance of this actuality on the _terrain_, and in the