The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
We may adjoin a further quite sufficient reason for the imperative
character of this radical definition of romantic art from another point
of view. The classic Ideal, where we find it at the culminating point
of its very truth, is self-exclusive, self-subsistent, retiring and not
susceptible[224] in its nature, an orbed individual totality, which
repels all else from itself. Its conformation is uniquely its own; its
life is bound up in that and that exclusively, and it will harbour
no affinity with what is purely empirical and contingent. Whoever,
therefore, approaches an ideal such as this as spectator, is unable
to appropriate its existence as an embodiment strictly akin to that
of his own presence. The figures of the eternal gods, albeit human,
do not belong to our mortality, for these gods have not themselves
experienced the infirmities of finite existence, but are directly
exalted above them. Their affinity with what is empirical and relative
is interrupted. The infinite subjectivity, what we call the Absolute
of romantic art, is on the contrary not absorbed in its presentment;
it is rather carried into its _own_ domain, and for this very reason
retains such external aspect as it possesses not so much _for itself_
as for the contemplation of others, as, in short, an exterior presence
which is freely offered for this purpose. This externality must further
appear in the form of common fact, the human as our senses perceive
it, since it is through that that God Himself descends to the level
of finite and temporal existence, in order to mediate and reconcile
the absolute antithesis, which is inherent in the notion of the
Absolute. For this reason our empirical humanity also contains in its
bodily presence an aspect, which unfolds to man a bond of affinity and
kinship, by virtue whereof he is able to contemplate even his direct
natural presence with assurance; and he can do so because the Divine
incarnation does not, with the severity of the classical type, thrust
on one side the particular and contingent, but presents to his vision
that which he himself possesses, or that which he recognizes and loves
in others around him. It is just this homeliness incidental to what we
ordinarily meet with which attracts and enables romantic art to entrust
itself to the external aspect of reality. Inasmuch, then, as the
externality which is turned adrift is called upon, through this very
abandonment, to suggest the beauty of soul, the lofty pretension of its
spirituality and the sacred colour of the emotional life, so, too, at
the same time, it is a condition of its doing so that it be absorbed
itself within the ideal realm of mind and its absolute content, and
that it appropriate the same.