The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
It is wholly different in romantic poetry. In so far as it is of the
world worldly, and is not directly associated with the story of our
Lord, the virtues and objects of its heroism are not those of the
Greek heroes, whose type of morality Christendom in its early days
simply regarded as a brilliant enormity. Greek morality presupposes
the presence of humanity in its complete configuration, in which
the volition then and there as it ought to act conformably to its
essential notion of independence has received a definite content and
the actual conditions of freedom imperatively valid such as belong to
that content. Such are the relations of parents and children, married
persons, or of citizens of city or State in the realized liberty of
such. Now inasmuch as this objective content of human affairs belongs
to the _evolution_ of man's spirit on the basis of Nature cognized
and insured as actual fact, it is unable any longer to satisfy that
self-absorbed introspection of the religious life, which seeks to
destroy the natural aspect of human life, and must deviate considerably
from the virtue of humility which opposes it, and the surrender of
human freedom and its staunch self-dependence. The virtues of Christian
piety simply prove the death of such a world-attitude if held in their
extreme of abstraction, and only make the individual free, when he
absolutely denies the human part of him. The individual freedom of our
present sphere is no doubt no longer conditioned by mere endurance
and self-sacrifice but essentially positive in the world arena; that
infinite self-relation of the individual has, however, as we have
already discovered, the inward realm of the soul as its content and
only that, the subjective soul, that is, whose movement is in its own
peculiar medium, as the secular ground of its own domain. In this
connection poetry does not draw from any objective material already
presented it, no mythology, for instance, no imaginative pictures
and embodiments, which already lie ready waiting for its expression.
It stands there wholly free, without any extraneous matter, purely
creative and productive. It is free as a bird that sings straight
from its breast. It follows, then, if this subjective activity
proceeds also from a noble will and a profound soul, we shall merely
have in its workings and relations and existence the evidence of
caprice and contingency, for the reason that freedom and its aims
proceed, relatively to a content which is throughout immaterial, from
internal self-reflection. And, consequently, we do not find so much in
individuals a particular pathos in the Greek conception of the term
and a vital self-subsistency of character associated with it by the
closest bonds, as that which is simply a grade of heroic conception in
its connection with love, honour, bravery, and fidelity; a grade into
which it is mainly the nobility or depravity of soul which imports the
distinguishing features.