The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_γ_) And in the _third_ case we may find in a general way that
_external_ condition and its impediments oppose obstacles in the path
of love. Such are the ordinary course of events, the prose of ordinary
existence, misfortunes, passion, prejudice, follies, the selfishness
of others, occurrences of every conceivable complexity and kind. Much
will here present itself that is hateful, terrible, and mean, for
it is mainly the evil, ruthless, and savage aspects of other forms
of human passion which work contrary to the tender spiritual beauty
of love. More particularly in later times we frequently come across
external collisions of this sort in dramas, narratives, and romances,
works whose main interest centres in a sympathy for the sufferings,
expectations, and ruined prospects of unhappy lovers and affect or
satisfy us by means of their bad or happy endings, or merely provide
entertainment. This type of conflict, however, on the ground that it
merely depends upon accidental matters, is a subordinate one.
(_c_) No doubt love, from whatever of these points of view you choose
to regard it, possesses a lofty quality, in so far as it does not
merely remain an impulse of sex-attraction, but emphasizes the bounty
of a really rich, beautiful, and noble soul, and is a living, active,
courageous, and disinterested bond of union between one person and
another. But romantic love is also not without its _limitation._
That which disappears from its content is the essentially realized
_universality._[252] It is merely the _personal_ feeling of one
particular individual, which does not attest itself as fulfilled
with interest of eternal import and the actual content of organic
human life, as made up of family, political aims, one's own country,
obligations of profession, status, freedom, and religion, but merely
with the personal consideration which is intent upon receiving again
such private feeling as reflected back from some one else. Such
a content of what is itself still but a formal mode of spiritual
life does not correspond in full truth to the totality, which the
essentially complete personality[253] ought to be. In the family,
marriage, duty, and the State the personal feeling simply as such and
the unity which issues from it with some particular person and no other
is not the main point of interest. In the love of romance, however,
all centres in the fact that this man or woman loves that woman or man
and _no one else._ Yet it is precisely this fact that it is only this
or that person, which is solely based upon personal idiosyncracy, in
other words, the contingency of caprice. There is no lover who does
not think his beloved, no maiden who does not fancy her lover, as the
fairest and most supreme, to the exclusion of all others, although
they may appear very ordinary mortals in the eyes of other folk. But
in just this fact that all the world or, let us say, a large number,
act thus exclusively, and will not make an exception in favour of the