The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
an indefinite and consequently vacuous and content-less universality.
The substance of the Divine on the other hand persists through change
of form, passage over and advance to a system of many Deities, and the
abrogation of that system once more in the one highest form of God
unalterably one and the same. It is not that conception of the one
God, which itself essentially possesses, as this unity, the negative
aspect as its own determination, both necessary and appropriate to its
own essential notion. In an analogous way the destructive and hurtful
element is placed according to the Parsee view of existence _outside_
the personality of Ormuzd in Ahriman, and consequently only makes a
contradiction and conflict manifest belonging under no form of relation
to Ormuzd, as a distinct phase of his own substance.
The actual point in the advance which we have now to make consists,
therefore, in this that, on the one hand, the negative aspect, fixed
by consciousness in an independent relation as the Absolute, is,
however, on the other, merely regarded as a phase of the Divine, as
a phase, however, which is not only as outside the true Absolute
incidental to another Godhead[56], but is to be so ascribed to the
Absolute, that the true God appears as a process in which He negates
_Himself_, and thereby contains this negative element as an inherent
self-determination of His own substance.
Through this enlarged conception the Absolute is for the first time
essentially _concrete_, that is self-determination, and thereby
essential unity, whose particular antitheses, as parts of a process,
appear to consciousness as the different determinations of one and
the same God. For the necessity of giving essential definition to the
absolute significance is just that which at this stage it is felt to be
of first importance to satisfy. All the significances up to this point
persisted by virtue of their abstract character as absolutely undefined
and consequently void of content, or were merged, when in a converse
direction they tended to clear distinction, immediately in the Being of
Nature, or fell into a conflict in respect to their configuration which
gave them no repose and reconciliation. This twofold defect we have now
to remove, both by showing the advance of Thought regarded as itself an
ideal process, and by illustrating that advance by means of particular
facts of the mind and institutions of nations on the objective plane of
history.