The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
[Footnote 64: Hegel puts it in the rather obscure and contradictory way
that the human figure is represented as "still _having_ the most unique
form of subjective intensity (_Das eigenste Innre der Subjectivität_)
outside it."]
[Footnote 65: That is, the mythological history of the God.]
[Footnote 66: Lit., "Which alone is able to apply itself (that is, to
the work of interpretation) in a variety of directions."]
CHAPTER II
THE SYMBOLISM OF THE SUBLIME
The perspicuity that has no riddles to expound, which is the object
of symbolic art and veritably the mark of Spirit self-clothed to the
perfect measure of its own substance, can only be attained on condition
that first and foremost the significance be presented to consciousness
distinct and separate from all the phenomena of external existence.
To the union of both immediately envisaged we have traced the absence
of art among the ancient Parsees. The contradiction involved in their
severation, followed by the association which it then stimulated
under the mode of immediacy, was the source of the fantastic type of
Hindoo symbolism. Finally, we have seen that in Egypt, too, the free
and unfettered recognition of the Inward principle and a significance
essentially independent from the phenomenon was lacking; and this
resulted in the mystery and obscurity of a symbolism still more
complete.
The first decisive act of purification, or, in other words, express
separation of the essential substance[67] from the sensuous present,
that is from the empirical facts of external appearance, we must
accordingly seek for in the Sublime, which exalts the Absolute above
every form of immediate existence, and thereby effects that initiatory
mode of its abstract liberation which is the basis of the spiritual
content. As Spirit in its concreteness the significance is not yet
apprehended; but it is, however, conceived as an Inwardness essentially
existent, reposing on its own resources, and of such a nature that
purely finite phenomena are alone inadequate to express its truth.