The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
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World of Life's own drift of forces,
World, the wealth of whose wave-roll
Caught afar the bulbul's passion,
Won the song which shook the soul.
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3. In this unity of pantheism, moreover, if emphasized in its relation
to _personal_ life, which feels itself united with God thereby, and
the Divine as this presence intuitively cognized, we have, speaking
generally, that type of _mysticism_ which, under this more intimate
mode, has also been elaborated in the pale of Christendom. We will
adduce but one example, namely, that of Angelus Silecius, who, with the
greatest audacity and depth of conception and emotional fervour, has
expressed the essential presence of God in objective Nature, the union
of the self with God, and the Divine with human personality, with an
extraordinary power of mystical presentment. The more genuine type of
Oriental pantheism, on the contrary, is inclined to insist more upon
the vision of the One substance in all phenomena and the self-surrender
of the individual, who thereby secures the most supreme expansion of
conscious life no less than the bliss of absorption into all that is
most noble and excellent by virtue of the absolute release from all
finitude.
B. THE ART OF SUBLIMITY
The One substance, however, which is here conceived as the real
significance of the entire universe, is only truly posited as
_substance_ where we find it suffered to retire into itself as pure
Inwardness and substantive Power out of its presence and realization
beneath the shifting forms of the phenomenal, and thereby is _set
forth_ in self-consistency as against all finitude. It is not till
we come to this intuitive vision of the essence of God as absolutely
Spiritual and apart from all image, and thus opposed to the things of
the World and Nature, that the Spiritual is completely wrested from all
that pertains to mere sense-perception and Nature, and delivered from
determinate existence in the finite. While conversely, however, the
absolute substance still maintains a relation to the phenomenal world
from which it is reflected back upon itself. In this relation is now
asserted that _negative_ aspect already adverted to, which consists
in this, that the entire universe, despite all the fulness, power,
and glory of its phenomenal contents, is expressly affirmed in its
relation to substance as that which is essentially of a purely negative
subsistence, a creation of God, subject to His power and service. The
world is therefore envisaged as the revelation of God, and He is the
_Goodness_ which permits the created thing that has no essential claim
to exist, none the less to exist in relation to Himself, nay, further
to have independent existence and thereby freely to conserve Him. This
conservation on the part of the finitude, however, is without real
substance, and in opposition to God the creature is here assumed to
be that which passes away and is powerless, so that at the same time