The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_a_) Spirit as Spirit[133] is no doubt always subjectivity, that is
ideal knowledge of the Self, the Ego. This Ego can, however, separate
itself from everything that constitutes, whether in knowledge,
volition, conception, feeling, action, or achievement, the _universal_
and eternal content of Spirit, and can concentrate its hold on that
aspect of _individual_ experience which is unique and contingent. It
is then _subjectivity as such_ which we have before us, which has
let go the truly objective content of Spirit, and is self-related
formally, and without content. In the case of self-satisfaction, for
example, I can no doubt view myself from a certain standpoint in an
entirely objective way and remain satisfied with myself on account of
moral action. I do, however, as thus self-satisfied, already withdraw
myself from the content of such action. I separate myself as a distinct
person, as this particular Ego, from the universality of Spirit, in
order to compare myself with it. The sense of unison of myself with
myself through this comparison produces this self-satisfaction, in
which this determinate Ego, as this core of unity, rejoices in itself.
No doubt this personal Ego is involved in all that a man knows, wills,
or carries out; but it makes an immense difference whether, in-dealing
with knowledge and action, the matter of concern is the man's own
unique Ego, or that in which the essential content of consciousness
consists; whether, in other words, a man sinks himself and his
self-identity in this content, or lives in the unbroken seclusion of
his subjective personality.
(_α_) In this exaltation over what is substantive[134] the subjective
life passes into the abstract and disrupt world of personal
inclination, the caprice and contingency of emotions and impulses,
owing to which, in the changes to which it is subject in particular
acts and undertakings, it grows dependent upon particular circumstances
as they happen to arise, and is unable generally to dispense with this
association with something else. In such a condition of dependence the
individual life is nothing but _finite_ subjectivity as contrasted
with a real spirituality. And if this personal state essentially
persists through the volition and knowledge which characterizes it in
this contradiction of its conscious life, it can only further become
involved--to put on one side the mere emptiness of its imaginings and
self-conceits--in the deformity of character and its evil passions, in
crime and moral offence, in malice, cruelty, obstinacy, envy, pride,
insolence, and every other kind of the reverse side of human nature and
its insubstantial finiteness.