The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_γ_) Consequently the works of art, which carry on their face this
character, remain at the stage where the breach between significance
and form is not yet bridged over. For such a stage significance
is still of main importance, and what is aimed at is rather the
conception of that in its general aspect, than the vitalization of any
one individual figure and the artistic enjoyment derived from such
presentment. Sculpture proceeds here from the genius of an entire
people, about which we may on the one hand affirm, that it has in the
first instance arrived at the point where the need of _imaginative_
conception is disclosed; and it is satisfied to find that indicated in
the work of art, which is present in the conception, and here of course
is a conception which is _religious._ We are not therefore entitled,
taking into consideration the great strides they have made in laborious
activity upon and actual perfection in technical execution, to call
the Egyptians uneducated in their sculpture merely on the ground that,
despite all this, they did not as yet in great measure seek to attach
truth, vitality, and beauty to their results, by virtue of which
qualities the free work of art receives a soul. Doubtless from another
point of view the Egyptians did advance beyond the mere idea and its
necessary demand. They sought further to envisage and embody the same
in human and animal forms, nay, they knew how to comprehend and set
forth the forms, which they reproduced, clearly, without distortion and
in their just relations. They failed, however, to impart to them the
breath of vitality, which the human form in its natural state already
possesses, and to infuse with them that more exalted life, by virtue
of which an active and fluent motion of spirit could be expressed in a
created image that was adequate to its significance. Their works rather
attest a seriousness that is entirely lifeless, an unsolved riddle, so
that the configuration does not so much embody their own individual
ideality as permit us to surmise a further significance which is
still alien to it. I will here only adduce one example, namely, the
frequently recurring figure of Isis, holding Horus on her knees. Here
we have, so far as externals are concerned, the same subject-matter
that we meet with in Christian art as the Madonna and her Child. In the
symmetrical, straight-lined, and immovable pose of the Egyptian example
we discover, to quote a recent description[204], "neither a mother,
nor a child; there is no trace of affection, smile, or endearment, in
a word there is no real expression at all. Tranquil, unperturbed, and
immovable is this divine mother, who suckles her divine babe; or rather
we have here neither goddess nor mother, nor son, nor god. It is simply
the sensuous sign of a thought, which is capable of no result and no
passion; it is not the genuine presentation of a real action, still
less the just expression of a natural emotion."