The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
In such cases we have an analogous
sentiment of unconstrained love for a child, equally free from passion
and yearning; but, even putting on one side the maternal relation[224],
the expression possesses in no respect the intimacy, the depth of soul,
which confront us in Christian paintings. The ancients may very well
have painted excellent portraits, but neither their way of conceiving
natural fact, nor the point of view from which they regarded human and
divine conditions was of the kind that, in the case of painting, an
infusion of soul-life could be expressed with such intimate intensity
as was possible in Christian painting.
The demand of painting, however, for this more personal type of
inspiration is a result of its very material. In other words, the
sensuous medium in which it moves is an extension on pure surface, and
the display of form by means of the use of _diversified_ colours, by
virtue of which process the objective shape, as we have it presented
to the vision, is converted to an artificial illusion adopted by a
spiritual agency[225] in the place of the actual form of fact. It is
part of the principle of such a treatment of material that which is
external should not ultimately retain its validity in its independent
native existence, even in the modified form it takes as a vital
product of human hands, but should in this form of realization be
lowered as reality to a purely phenomenal reflex of the _inward_
soul-life itself, which seeks to contemplate itself independently as
such. When we look into the heart of the matter we shall find that
the advance from the rounded form of sculpture amounts to nothing
less than the above statement. It is the soul-life, the ideality
of Spirit which undertakes to express itself in an intimate way
through the counterfeit of the objective world. Add to this, in the
second place, that the surface on which the art of painting makes
its objects visible, opens independently the path to the employment
of a surrounding background and other complex relations; and colour
too, regarded as the articulation of that which appears, requires
a correspondent differentiation of soul-life, which can only be
rendered clearly through the definition of expression, situation,
and action, and consequently makes necessary variety, movement, and
the detailed exposition of both the inward and external life. This
principle of inwardness[226] taken alone, which at the same time in
its actual manifestation is associated with the variety of external
existence and is cognizable on the face of such particular existence
as an essentially complete and independent complex of conditions, we
have already seen to be the principle of the romantic type of art, in
whose configuration and mode of presentation consequently the medium
of painting discovers in a unique way its _wholly adequate object._
Conversely we may affirm at the same time that romantic art, when
the question is actually one of definite works of art, must seek for