The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
work, and gives us not merely a counterfeit of external objects, but
therewith his own personality and temperament[233]. And it is precisely
by his doing this that the objects of Nature, as reflected by painting,
even from this realistic point of view, are relatively insignificant,
because the influence of soul-life begins to assert itself in them as
the main significance. In this tendency towards temperament, which, in
the case of objects borrowed from external Nature, may frequently only
amount to a general response emphasized between the two sides, we find
the most important distinction between painting on the one hand and
sculpture and architecture on the other. Painting indeed approximates
in this respect more closely to music and emphasizes here the point of
transition from the plastic arts to that of tone.
(_b_) To proceed to our _second_ main division I have already several
times referred, if only in respect to features of fundamental
importance, to the difference we discover between the sensuous
_material_ of painting and that of sculpture. I will therefore in this
place only touch upon the closer connection which obtains between this
material and the spiritual content which it most notably has to display
to us.
(_α_) The first fact we have to consider in this connection is this
that painting compresses the _three_ dimensions, of Space. Absolute
concentration would be carried to the point, as elimination of
all juxtaposition, and as unrest essentially predicable of such
concentration, as we find it in the point of Time. Such a mode of
negation carried out in its entire result, however, we only meet
with in the art of music. Painting, on the contrary, permits the
spatial relation still to subsist, and only effaces _one_ of the three
dimensions; superficies is made the element of its representations.
This reduction of the three dimensions to level surface is implied
in principle of increasing reality, which is only capable thereby of
asserting itself in spatial relation as such ideal transmutation, owing
to the fact that it does not suffer the complete totality of objective
fact to persist as such, but restricts the same. Ordinarily we are
accustomed to view this reduction as a caprice of the art which amounts
to a defect. What is here sought for, it appears, is that natural
objects in all their naked reality, or spiritual ideas and feelings, by
means of the human body and its postures should be made visible to our
senses for such an aim it is obvious that the surface is insufficient
and inferior to Nature, which appears before us with a completeness
wholly different.