The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
It is this sacrifice
which constitutes the _motive_ principle of Love, the life and emotion
of which is bound up wholly in a self-surrender. In consequence of
this, if notwithstanding a man retains his consciousness of self in
an act of such surrender, and just in this very annihilation of his
personal independence attains to a truly positive self-subsistency,
in that case he has left him at least in the feeling of this unity
and its supreme happiness the negative aspect, the movement of Love's
principle, not so much in a sense of sacrifice, as of a blessedness
undeserved, which in despite of himself permits him still to feel his
assured identity at unity with itself. The movement is the feeling of
the dialectical contradiction, namely, to have surrendered personality
and yet to remain in self-subsistent unity, a contradiction which is
present in Love and eternally resolved in it.
In so far, then, as the aspect of an individual _human_ state of
soul-life is concerned in this universal condition we find that the
unique Love, which blesses and discovers its heaven within it, tends
to rise over all that is finite and the specific individuality of
character, which lapses into a position of insignificance. Already
we have observed that the divine ideals of sculpture pass into one
another, always provided, however, that they are not wrested from
the content and province of that original and immediate type of
individuality; and yet it must be admitted that this individuality
remains the essential form of the mode of presentment. In this later
pure gleam of blessedness, however, particularity is on the contrary
cancelled. Before God all men are equal, or rather piety makes them
actually equal, so that the sole point of importance is the expression
of love in the concentrated focus above depicted, and which has no
further need of happiness, or this or that particular object. No doubt
religious Love, too, requires definite individuals as a condition of
its existence, which possess also, apart from this experience, other
spheres of existence; for the reason, however, that this soul-possessed
state of intimate life supplies the really ideal content, the
expression and reality of such are not to be found in the isolated
distinctions of character, its talents, conditions, and fortunes, but
are rather lifted above the same. When consequently nowadays we hear
people make a regard for distinctions in the soul-life of different
persons a matter of first importance in education, and in that which
is the essential requirement of each man individually, from which we
deduce the fundamental thesis that every one will and indeed inevitably
must act differently in a given case, such a position directly clashes
with the fact of the love of religion, in which all such diversities
of individual life fall into the background. Conversely, however,
individual characterization now, precisely for the reason that it