The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_γγ_) In this respect, later forms of lyric art are expressly
distinguishable from the folk-song. There are, no doubt, folk-songs
which originate contemporaneously with the works of a genuine lyrical
_art._ These latter, however, belong to a range and type of individuals
such as--far from participating in more modern stages of artistic
culture--are, in the entire nature of their general outlook, not yet
liberated from the immediate popular sense. We must, however, not
regard this distinction between the Lyric of the folk-song and the
artistic poem as though it was only when reflection and the artistic
consciousness, in union with deliberate executive ability, appear
with all the elegance of such a union, that the Lyric attains to its
perfection. Such a notion would really amount to this--that a Horace,
for instance, and the Roman lyric poets generally, were to be reckoned
among the finest writers of this type, or even in their own range
that the Master Singers were preferable to the preceding epoch of
the genuine Minnesong. Such an extreme deduction from our previous
statement is not justified. What we ought to conclude is this, that
individual imagination and art directed to the service of this very
self-consistent personal life, which in fact constitutes its principle,
presupposes also, for the basis of their true perfection, a free and
self-trained recognition of imaginative idea no less than artistic
activity.
(_γ_) We have our _final_ phase of composition to distinguish from
those already discussed. The folk-song appears before the true
elaboration of a prosaically organized condition of actual conscious
life. Lyric poetry of the truly artistic type, on the other hand,
wrests itself away from the prosaic coordination which surrounds it,
and creates from the poet's imagination, in its acquired independence,
a new poetic world of inward observation and emotion, by means of
which, for the first time, the true content and type of expression
truly adequate to the human soul, as seen from within, becomes the
object of vital art. There is, however, over and above this, a form of
intelligence which, from this point of view, stands in a more exalted
position than the imagination of the emotional or conceptive life,
inasmuch as it is able, with more penetrative universality and more
necessary coalescence to bring its content before our free cognition
than is ever possible to art. This is _philosophical thought._
Conversely, however, this form is attached to the abstract condition of
being exclusively evolved in the medium of thought, posited as wholly
ideal universality; and, in consequence, the concrete man may find
himself also constrained to express the content and the results of his
philosophical consciousness in a concrete way, that is, as permeated by
his temperament and sensuous perception, his imagination and feeling,
in order thereby to possess and exhaust the absolute expression of all
that engages either soul or intellect.