The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_α_) Now the content of the Lyric embraces, as we have seen, first,
a type of contemplation, which connects the universal quality of
determinate being with its conditions, and, secondly, the manifold
character of its detailed aspects. Regarded, however, as pure
generalizations and particular points of view of emotional condition
these constituents, both of them, are nothing more than abstractions.
In order that these may acquire a vital lyrical individuality, a
principle of combination is necessary which can only be of an ideal, in
other words really personal[7] character. Consequently the creatively
concrete person, the _poet_ himself, must be further presupposed as the
focus and in fact realized content of lyrical poetry. He must be there,
however, in a form which is not carried to the point of definitive act
and deed, or to that of the evolved movement of dramatic conflicts. His
exclusive expression and activity is on the contrary restricted to the
fact that he endows his inner experience with an articulate speech such
as portrays the spiritual significance of himself as subject in his
self-expression, whatever the material selected may be, and endeavours
to arouse in and keep the hearer alive to the like meaning and spirit,
the same soul-state, the similar course of reflection.
(_β_) But, furthermore, the expression cannot rest alone in this
result, however successful, in so far as it is for others a free
overflooding of buoyant delight, or the resolution and reconciliation
of grief in song and lyric, or the yet profounder impulse, which issues
in the most serious emotions of heart and the most far-reaching views
of intelligence. The man who sings and can write poetry has a necessary
vocation thereto. He composes because he _cannot do otherwise._ At
the same time the external incentive, the direct invitation and the
like are by no means excluded. The great lyric poet, however, in such
a case soon swerves aside from such an external stimulus. His supreme
object is himself. To take the example once more to which we have
constantly recurred, Pindar was frequently invited to celebrate this
or that laurel-crowned victor, nay, he frequently accepted payment
therefor; and yet, for all that, it is he himself, the minstrel, who
changes places with his hero. He combines freely his own unfettered
imagination with his praise of the exploits of ancestors, or it maybe
his memory of myths; or, when he gives voice to his profound views
of life, of wealth, of mastery, of all that is great and deserving,
of the supremacy and loveliness of the Muses, and above all of the
high vocation of the singer. It is not so much the hero in the renown
that he spreads far and wide, that he honours in his poems. We are
invited to listen to him, the poet. The honour is not to him in that he
celebrates the victor, but rather to the victor that he is celebrated
by Pindar. And it is this emphatic personal sense of greatness which
constitutes the nobility of the lyric poet.