The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
much may still be trusted to the imagination, which would conflict with
our ordinary perception and notion of probability. The most convenient
course in this, as in other matters, is a happy mean; in other words,
while not wholly excluding the claim of purely natural fact and
perception, we may still permit ourselves considerable license in our
attitude to both.
(_ββ_) The unity of _time_ is a precisely similar case. In the pure
realm of imaginative idea we may no doubt, with no difficulty, combine
vast periods of time; in the direct vision of perception we cannot
so readily pass over a few years. If the action is, therefore, of a
simple character, viewed in its entire content and conflict, we shall
do best to concentrate the time of such a conflict, from its origin
to its resolution, in a restricted period. If, on the contrary, it
demands character richly diversified, whose development necessitates
many situations which, in the matter of time, lie widely apart from
one another, then the formal unity of a purely relative and entirely
conventional duration of time will be essentially impossible. To
attempt to remove such a representation from the domain of dramatic
poetry, on the _primâ facie_ ground that it is inconsistent with the
strict rule of time-unity would simply amount to making the prose of
ordinary facts the final court of appeal, as against the truth of
poetic creation. Least of all need we waste time in discussing the
purely empirical probability that as audience we could, in the course
of a few hours, witness also, directly through our sense, merely the
passage of a short space of time. For it is precisely in the case
where the poet is most at pains to illustrate this conclusion that,
from other points of view, he well-nigh invariably perpetrates the most
glaring improbabilities.
(_γγ_) In contrast to the above examples of unity, that of _action_ is
the one truly inviolable rule. The true nature, however, of this unity
may be a matter of considerable dispute. I will therefore develop my
own views of its significance at greater length.