The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 01 (of 11) — Thomas Hobbes — John Shaqi
The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 01 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
1. I have, in the first chapter, defined philosophy to be _knowledge of
effects acquired by true ratiocination, from knowledge first had of
their causes and generation; and of such causes or generations as may
be, from former knowledge of their effects or appearances_. There are,
therefore, two methods of philosophy; one, from the generation of things
to their possible effects; and the other, from their effects or
appearances to some possible generation of the same. In the former of
these the truth of the first principles of our ratiocination, namely
definitions, is made and constituted by ourselves, whilst we consent and
agree about the appellations of things. And this part I have finished in
the foregoing chapters; in which, if I am not deceived, I have affirmed
nothing, saving the definitions themselves, which hath not good
coherence with the definitions I have given; that is to say, which is
not sufficiently demonstrated to all those, that agree with me in the
use of words and appellations; for whose sake only I have written the
same. I now enter upon the other part; which is the finding out by the
appearances or effects of nature, which we know by sense, some ways and
means by which they may be, I do not say they are, generated. The
principles, therefore, upon which the following discourse depends, are
not such as we ourselves make and pronounce in general terms, as
definitions; but such, as being placed in the things themselves by the
Author of Nature, are by us observed in them; and we make use of them in
single and particular, not universal propositions. Nor do they impose
upon us any necessity of constituting theorems; their use being only,
though not without such general propositions as have been already
demonstrated, to show us the possibility of some production or
generation. Seeing, therefore, the science, which is here taught, hath
its principles in the appearances of nature, and endeth in the attaining
of some knowledge of natural causes, I have given to this part the title
of PHYSICS, or the _Phenomena of Nature_. Now such things as appear, or
are shown to us by nature, we call phenomena or appearances.
Of all the phenomena or appearances which are near us, the most
admirable is apparition itself, τὸ φαίνεσθαι; namely, that some natural
bodies have in themselves the patterns almost of all things, and others
of none at all. So that if the appearances be the principles by which we
know all other things, we must needs acknowledge sense to be the
principle by which we know those principles, and that all the knowledge
we have is derived from it. And as for the causes of sense, we cannot
begin our search of them from any other phenomenon than that of sense
itself. But you will say, by what sense shall we take notice of sense? I
answer, by sense itself, namely, by the memory which for some time
remains in us of things sensible, though they themselves pass away. For
he that perceives that he hath perceived, remembers.