The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 01 (of 11) — Thomas Hobbes — John Shaqi
The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 01 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
5. That space, by which word I here understand imaginary space, which is
coincident with the magnitude of any body, is called the _place_ of that
body; and the body itself is that which we call the _thing placed_. Now
_place_, and the _magnitude_ of the thing placed, differ. First in this,
that a body keeps always the same _magnitude_, both when it is at rest,
and when it is moved; but when it is moved, it does not keep the same
_place_. Secondly in this, that _place_ is a phantasm of any body of
such and such quantity and figure; but _magnitude_ is the peculiar
accident of every body; for one body may at several times have several
places, but has always one and the same magnitude. Thirdly in this, that
_place_ is nothing out of the mind, nor _magnitude_ any thing within it.
And lastly, _place_ is feigned extension, but _magnitude_ true
extension; and a placed body is not extension, but a thing extended.
Besides, _place is immovable_; for, seeing that which is moved, is
understood to be carried from place to place, if place were moved, it
would also be carried from place to place, so that one place must have
another place, and that place another place, and so on infinitely, which
is ridiculous. And as for those, that, by making _place_ to be of the
same nature with _real space_, would from thence maintain it to be
immovable, they also make place, though they do not perceive they make
it so, to be a mere phantasm. For whilst one affirms that place is
therefore said to be immovable, because space in general is considered
there; if he had remembered that nothing is general or universal besides
names or signs, he would easily have seen that that space, which he says
is considered in general, is nothing but a phantasm, in the mind or the
memory, of a body of such magnitude and such figure. And whilst another
says: real space is made immovable by the understanding; as when, under
the superficies of running water, we imagine other and other water to
come by continual succession, that superficies fixed there by the
understanding, is the _immovable place_ of the river: what else does he
make it to be but a phantasm, though he do it obscurely and in perplexed
words? Lastly, the nature of _place_ does not consist in the
_superficies of the ambient_, but in _solid space_; for the whole placed
body is coextended with its whole place, and every part of it with every
answering part of the same place; but seeing every placed body is a
solid thing, it cannot be understood to be coextended with superficies.
Besides, how can any whole body be moved, unless all its parts be moved
together with it? Or how can the internal parts of it be moved, but by
leaving their place? But the internal parts of a body cannot leave the
superficies of an external part contiguous to it; and, therefore, it
follows, that if place be the superficies of the ambient, then the parts
of a body moved, that is, bodies moved, are not moved.
[Sidenote: What is full and empty.]