9. But perhaps for this very reason, some will say that a _popular_ state is much to be preferred before a _monarchical_; because that where all men have a hand in public businesses, there all have an opportunity to shew their wisdom, knowledge, and eloquence, in deliberating matters of the greatest difficulty and moment; which by reason of that desire of praise which is bred in human nature, is to them who excel in such-like faculties, and seem to themselves to exceed others, the most delightful of all things. But in a monarchy, this same way to obtain praise and honour is shut up to the greatest part of subjects; and what is a grievance if this be none? I will tell you: to see his opinion, whom we scorn, preferred before ours; to have our wisdom undervalued before our own faces; by an uncertain trial of a little vain glory, to undergo most certain enmities (for this cannot be avoided, whether we have the better or the worse); to hate and to be hated, by reason of the disagreement of opinions; to lay open our secret councils and advices to all, to no purpose and without any benefit; to neglect the affairs of our own family: these, I say, are grievances. But to be absent from a trial of wits, although those trials are pleasant to the eloquent, is not therefore a grievance to them; unless we will say, that it is a grievance to valiant men to be restrained from fighting, because they delight in it. [Sidenote: Civil deliberations are unadvisedly committed to many, by reason of the unskilfulness of most men:] 10. Besides, there are many reasons, why deliberations are less successful in great assemblies than in lesser councils. Whereof one is, that to advise rightly of all things conducing to the preservation of a commonweal, we must not only understand matters at home, but foreign affairs too. At home, by what goods the country is nourished and defended, and whence they are fetched; what places are fit to make garrisons of; by what means soldiers are best to be raised and maintained; what manner of affections the subjects bear towards their prince or governors of their country; and many the like. Abroad, what the power of each neighbouring country is, and wherein it consists; what advantage or disadvantage we may receive from them; what their dispositions are both to us-ward, and how affected to each other among themselves; and what counsel daily passeth among them. Now, because very few in a great assembly of men understand these things, being for the most part unskilful, that I say not incapable of them, what can that same number of advisers with their impertinent opinions contribute to good counsels, other than mere lets and impediments? [Sidenote: By reason of their eloquence:]