13. _The knowledge of the laws_ depends on the legislator; who must publish them; for otherwise they are not laws. For law is the command of the law-maker, and his command is the declaration of his will; it is not therefore a law, except the will of the law-maker be declared, which is done by _promulgation_. Now in _promulgation_ two things must be manifest; whereof one is, that he or they who publish a law, either have a right themselves to make laws, or that they do it by authority derived from him or them who have it; the other is the sense of the law itself. Now, that the first, namely, published laws, proceed from him who hath the supreme command, cannot be manifest (speaking exactly and philosophically) to any, but them who have received them from the mouth of the commander. The rest believe; but the reasons of their belief are so many, that it is scarce possible they should not believe. And truly in a _democratical_ city, where every one may be present at the making of laws if he will, he that shall be absent, must believe those that were present. But in _monarchies_ and _aristocracies_, because it is granted but to few to be present, and openly to hear the commands of the _monarch_ or the _nobles_, it was necessary to bestow a power on those few of publishing them to the rest. And thus we believe those to be the _edicts_ and _decrees_ of princes, which are propounded to us for such, either by the writings or voices of them whose office it is to publish them. But yet, when we have these causes of belief; that we have seen the prince or supreme counsel constantly use such _counsellors_, _secretaries_, _publishers_, and _seals_, and the like arguments for the declaring of his will; that he never took any authority from them; that they have been punished, who not giving credit to such like promulgations have transgressed the law; not only he who thus believing shall obey the _edicts_ and _decrees_ set forth by them, is everywhere excused, but he that not believing shall not yield obedience, is punished. For the constant permission of these things is a manifest sign enough and evident declaration of the commander’s will; provided there be nothing contained in the _law_, _edict_, or _decree_, derogatory from his supreme power. For it is not to be imagined that he would have aught taken from his power by any of his officers, as long as he retains a will to govern. Now the _sense_ of the _law_, when there is any doubt made of it, is to be taken from them to whom the supreme authority hath committed the _knowledge of causes_ or _judgments_; for to _judge_, is nothing else than by _interpretation_ to apply the _laws_ to particular cases. Now we may know who they are that have this office granted them, in the same manner as we know who they be that have authority given them to publish laws. [Sidenote: The civil law divided into written and unwritten.]