3. But men, by reason of their passions, will very hardly be persuaded that a _kingdom_ and _tyranny_ are not diverse kinds of cities; who though they would rather have the city subject to one than many, yet do they not believe it to be well governed unless it accord with their judgments. But we must discover by reason, and not by passion, what the difference is between a king and a tyrant. But first, they differ not in this, that a tyrant hath the greater power; for greater than the supreme cannot be granted; nor in this, that one hath a limited power, the other not; for he whose authority is limited, is no king, but his subject that limits him. Lastly, neither differ they in their manner of acquisition; for if in a democratical or aristocratical government some one citizen should, by force, possess himself of the supreme power, if he gain the consent of all the citizens, he becomes a legitimate monarch; if not, he is an enemy, not a tyrant. They differ therefore in the sole exercise of their command, insomuch as he is said to be a king who governs well, and he a tyrant that doth otherwise. The case therefore is brought to this pass; that _a king_, legitimately constituted in his government, if he seem to his subjects to rule well and to their liking, they afford him the appellation of a _king_; if not, they count him a _tyrant_. Wherefore we see a _kingdom_ and _tyranny_ are not diverse forms of government, but one and the self-same monarch hath the name of a _king_ given him in point of honour and reverence to him, and of a _tyrant_ in way of contumely and reproach. But what we frequently find in books said against tyrants, took its original from Greek and Roman writers, whose government was partly democratical, and partly aristocratical, and therefore not tyrants only, but even kings were odious to them. [Sidenote: That there can no mixed state be formed out of these forenamed kinds of government.]