5. Let us see a little now, in the constituting of each form of government what the constitutors do. Those who met together with intention to erect a city, were almost in the very act of meeting, a democracy. For in that they willingly met, they are supposed obliged to the observation of what shall be determined by the major part; which, while that convent lasts, or is adjourned to some certain days and places, is a clear democracy. For that convent, whose will is the will of all the citizens, hath the supreme authority; and because in this convent every man is supposed to have a right to give his voice, it follows that it is a democracy, by the definition given in the first article of this chapter. But if they depart and break up the convent, and appoint no time or place where and when they shall meet again, the public weal returns to anarchy and the same state it stood in before their meeting, that is, to the state of all men warring against all. The people, therefore, retains the supreme power, no longer than there is a certain day and place publicly appointed and known, to which whosoever will may resort. For except that be known and determined, they may either meet at divers times and places, that is, in factions, or not at all; and then it is no longer δῆμος, _the people_, but a dissolute multitude, to whom we can neither attribute any action or right. Two things therefore frame a democracy; whereof one, to wit, the perpetual prescription of convents, makes δῆμον, _the people_; the other, which is a plurality of voices, τὸ κράτος, or _the power_. [Sidenote: In democracy, the intervals of the times of convening must be short, or the administration of the government committed to some one.] 6. Furthermore, it will not be sufficient for the people, so as to maintain its supremacy, to have some certain known times and places of meeting, unless that either the intervals of the times be of less distance, than that anything may in the meantime happen whereby, by reason of the defect of power, the city may be brought into some danger; or at least that the exercise of the supreme authority be, during the interval, granted to some one man or council. For unless this be done, there is not that wary care and heed taken for the defence and peace of single men, which ought to be; and therefore it will not deserve the name of a city, because that in it, for want of security, every man’s right of defending himself at his own pleasure returns to him again. [Sidenote: In a democracy, particulars contract with particulars to obey the people: the people is obliged to no man.]