The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 03 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
5. If the sovereign of one commonwealth, subdue a people that have lived
under other written laws, and afterwards govern them by the same laws,
by which they were governed before; yet those laws are the civil laws of
the victor, and not of the vanquished commonwealth. For the legislator
is he, not by whose authority the laws were first made, but by whose
authority they now continue to be laws. And therefore where there be
divers provinces, within the dominion of a commonwealth, and in those
provinces diversity of laws, which commonly are called the customs of
each several province, we are not to understand that such customs have
their force, only from length of time; but that they were anciently laws
written, or otherwise made known, for the constitutions, and statutes of
their sovereigns; and are now laws, not by virtue of the prescription of
time, but by the constitutions of their present sovereigns. But if an
unwritten law, in all the provinces of a dominion, shall be generally
observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that law can be no
other but a law of nature, equally obliging all mankind.
[Sidenote: Some foolish opinions of lawyers concerning the making of
laws.]
6. Seeing then all laws, written and unwritten, have their authority and
force, from the will of the commonwealth; that is to say, from the will
of the representative; which in a monarchy is the monarch, and in other
commonwealths the sovereign assembly; a man may wonder from whence
proceed such opinions, as are found in the books of lawyers of eminence
in several commonwealths, directly, or by consequence making the
legislative power depend on private men, or subordinate judges. As for
example, _that the common law, hath no controller but the parliament_;
which is true only where a parliament has the sovereign power, and
cannot be assembled, nor dissolved, but by their own discretion. For if
there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there is a right also to
control them, and consequently to control their controllings. And if
there be no such right, then the controller of laws is not
_parliamentum_, but _rex in parliamento_. And where a parliament is
sovereign, if it should assemble never so many, or so wise men, from the
countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there is no man
will believe, that such an assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves
a legislative power. _Item_, that the two arms of a commonwealth, are
_force and justice; the first whereof is in the king; the other
deposited in the hands of the parliament_. As if a commonwealth could
consist, where the force were in any hand, which justice had not the
authority to command and govern.
[Sidenote: Sir Edw. Coke upon Littleton, lib. 2, ch. 6, fol. 97, b.]