The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 03 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
Again, the injustice of manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to do
injury; and is injustice before it proceed to act; and without supposing
any individual person injured. But the injustice of an action, that is
to say injury, supposeth an individual person injured; namely him, to
whom the covenant was made: and therefore many times the injury is
received by one man, when the damage redoundeth to another. As when the
master commandeth his servant to give money to a stranger; if it be not
done, the injury is done to the master, whom he had before covenanted to
obey; but the damage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no
obligation; and therefore could not injure him. And so also in
commonwealths, private men may remit to one another their debts; but not
robberies or other violences, whereby they are endamaged; because the
detaining of debt, is an injury to themselves; but robbery and violence,
are injuries to the person of the commonwealth.
[Sidenote: Nothing done to a man by his own consent can be injury.]
Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own will signified to
the doer, is no injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed
away his original right to do what he please, by some antecedent
covenant, there is no breach of covenant; and therefore no injury done
him. And if he have; then his will to have it done being signified, is a
release of that covenant: and so again there is no injury done him.
[Sidenote: Justice commutative and distributive.]
Justice of actions, is by writers divided into _commutative_, and
_distributive_: and the former they say consisteth in proportion
arithmetical; the latter in proportion geometrical. Commutative
therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted
for; and distributive, in the distribution of equal benefit, to men of
equal merit. As if it were injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to
give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted
for, is measured by the appetite of the contractors: and therefore the
just value, is that which they be contented to give. And merit, besides
that which is by covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth
the performance of the other part, and falls under justice commutative,
not distributive, is not due by justice; but is rewarded of grace only.
And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be
expounded, is not right. To speak properly, commutative justice, is the
justice, of a contractor; that is, a performance of covenant, in buying,
and selling; hiring, and letting to hire; lending, and borrowing;
exchanging, bartering, and other acts of contract.