13. Further, it is to be supposed, his intention was, that his own children should be preferred in the succession, when nothing to the contrary is expressly declared, before any other. For men naturally seek their own honour, and that consisteth in the honour of their children after them. [Sidenote: The males before the females.] 14. Again, seeing every monarch is supposed to desire to continue the government in his successors, as long as he may; and that generally men are endued with greater parts of wisdom and courage, by which all monarchies are kept from dissolution, than women are; it is to be presumed, where no express will is extant to the contrary, he preferreth his male children before the female. Not but that women may govern, and have in divers ages and places governed wisely, but are not so apt thereto in general, as men. [Sidenote: The eldest before the rest of the brothers.] 15. Because the sovereign power is indivisible, it cannot be supposed, that he intended the same should be divided, but that it should descend entirely upon one of them, which is to be presumed, should be the eldest, assigned thereto by the lot of nature, because he appointed no other lot for the decision thereof. Besides, what difference of ability soever there may be amongst the brethren, the odds shall be adjudged to the elder, because no subject hath authority otherwise to judge thereof. [Sidenote: The brother next to the children.] 16. And for want of issue in the possessor, the brother shall be presumed successor. For by the judgment of nature, next in blood is next in love; and next in love is next to preferment. [Sidenote: The succession of the possessor, &c.] 17. And as the succession followeth the first monarch, so also it followeth him or her that is in possession; and consequently, the children of him in possession, shall be preferred before the children of his father, or predecessor. ------- CHAPTER V. 1. The utility of the commonwealth, &c. 2. The loss of liberty, &c. 3. Monarchy approved by, &c. 4. Monarchy less subject to passion, &c. 5, 6. Subjects in monarchy, &c. 7. Laws in monarchy less changeable, &c. 8. Monarchies less subject to dissolution. [Sidenote: The utility of the commonwealth, &c.]