4. And first, it seemeth inconvenient there should be committed so great a power to one man, as that it might be lawful to no other man or men to resist the same; and some think it inconvenient _eo nomine_, because he hath the power. But this reason we may not by any means admit, for it maketh it inconvenient to be ruled by Almighty God, who without question hath more power over every man, than can be conferred upon any monarch. This inconvenience therefore must be derived not from the power, but from the affections and passions which reign in every one, as well monarch as subject, by which the monarch may be swayed to use that power amiss: and because an aristocracy consisteth of men, if the passions of many men be more violent when they are assembled together, than the passions of one man alone, it will follow, that the inconvenience arising from passions will be greater in an _aristocracy_, than a _monarchy_. But there is no doubt, when things are debated in great assemblies, but every man delivering his opinion at large without interruption, endeavoureth to make whatsoever he is to set forth for good, better; and what he would have apprehended as evil, worse, as much as is possible, to the end his counsel may take place; which counsel also is never without aim at his own benefit, or honour; every man’s end being some good to himself. Now this cannot be done without working on the passions of the rest. And thus the passions of these that are singly moderate, are altogether vehement; even as a great many coals, though but warm asunder, being put together, inflame one another. [Sidenote: Subjects in monarchy, &c.] 5. Another inconvenience of monarchy, is this, that the monarch, besides the riches necessary for the defence of the commonwealth, may take so much more from the subjects, as may enrich his children, kindred and favourites, to what degree he pleaseth; which though it be indeed an inconvenience, if he should so do, yet is the same both greater in an aristocracy, and also more likely to come to pass, for there not one only, but many have children, kindred, and friends to raise. And in that point they are as twenty monarchs for one, and likely to set forward one another’s designs mutually, to the oppression of all the rest. The same also happeneth in a democracy, if they all do agree; otherwise they bring a worse inconvenience; to wit, sedition. 6. Another inconvenience of monarchy, is the power of dispensing with the execution of justice, whereby the family and friends of the monarch, may, with impunity, commit outrages upon the people, or oppress them with extortion. But in aristocracies, not only one, but many have power of taking men out of the hands of justice, and no man is willing his kindred or friends should be punished according to their demerits. And therefore they understand amongst themselves without further speaking, as a tacit covenant, _hodie mihi, cras tibi_. [Sidenote: Laws in monarchy less changeable, &c.]