3. And from this may be deduced, that which to some may seem a _paradox, That the command of him, whose command is a law in one thing, is a law in every thing_. For seeing a man is obliged to obedience before what he is to do be known, he is obliged to obey in general, that is to say, in every thing. [Sidenote: The difference between law and counsel.] 4. That the counsel of a man is no law to him that is counselled, and that he who alloweth another to give him counsel, doth not thereby oblige himself to follow the same, is manifest enough. And yet men usually call counselling, by the name of governing; not that they are not able to distinguish between them, but because they envy many times those men that are called to counsel, and are therefore angry with them that they are counselled. But if to counsellors there should be given a right to have their counsel followed, then are they no more counsellors, but masters of them whom they counsel; and their counsels no more counsels, but laws. For the difference between a law and a counsel being no more but this, that in counsel the expression is, _Do, because it is best_; in a law, _Do, because I have a right to compel you_; or _Do, because I say, do_; when counsel should give the reason of the action it adviseth to, because the reason thereof itself is no more counsel, but a law. [Sidenote: The difference between _jus_ & _lex_.] 5. The names _lex_ and _jus_, that is to say, law and right, are often confounded, and yet scarce are there any two words of more contrary signification. For right is that liberty which law leaveth us, and laws those restraints by which we agree mutually to abridge one another’s liberty. Law and right therefore are no less different than restraint and liberty, which are contrary; and whatsoever a man doth, that liveth in a commonwealth _jure_, he doth it _jure civili_, _jure naturæ_, and _jure divino_. For whatsoever is against any of these laws, cannot be said to be _jure_. For the civil law cannot make that to be done _jure_, which is against the law _divine_, or of _nature_. And therefore whatsoever any subject doth, if it be not contrary to the civil law, and whatsoever a sovereign doth, if it be not against the law of nature, he doth it _jure divino_, by _divine right_. But to say, _lege divinâ_, by _divine law_, is another thing. For the laws of God and nature allowing greater liberty than is allowed by the law civil; for subordinate laws do still bind more than superior laws, the essence of law being not to loose, but to bind, a man may be commanded that by a law civil, which is not commanded by the law of nature, nor by the law divine. So that of things done _lege_, that is to say, by command of the law, there is some place for a distinction between _lege divinâ_, and _lege civili_. As when a man giveth an alms, or helpeth him that is in need, he doth it not _lege civili_, but _lege divinâ_, by the divine law, the precept whereof is _charity_. But