Your Lordship therefore is to consider, that all _voluntary_ actions, where the thing that induceth the _will_ is not _fear_, are called also _spontaneous_, and said to be done by a man’s _own_ accord. As when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, or out of affection, he is said to do it of his own accord, which in Latin is _sponte_, and therefore the action is _spontaneous_; though to give one’s money willingly to a thief to avoid killing, or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning, where the motive is _fear_, be not called _spontaneous_. But every _spontaneous_ action is not therefore _voluntary_, for _voluntary_ presupposes some precedent _deliberation_, that is to say, some _consideration_, and _meditation_, of what is likely to _follow_, both upon the doing, and abstaining from the action deliberated of; whereas many actions are done of our _own_ accord, and are therefore _spontaneous_, for which nevertheless, as my Lord thinks, we never _consulted_ nor _deliberated_ in ourselves. As when making no question nor any the least doubt in the world, but the thing we are about is good, we _eat_ and _walk_, or in anger _strike_ or _revile_, which my Lord thinks spontaneous, but not voluntary nor elective actions, and with _such_ kind of actions, he says _necessitation_ may stand, but not with such as are _voluntary_, and proceed upon _election_ and _deliberation_. Now if I make it appear to your Lordship, that those actions, which, he says, proceed from _spontaneity_, and which he ascribes to _children_, _fools_, _madmen_, and _beasts_, proceed from _election_ and _deliberation_, and that actions _inconsiderate_, _rash_, and _spontaneous_, are ordinarily found in those, that are by themselves and many more thought as _wise_, or wiser than ordinarily men are, then my Lord Bishop’s argument concludeth, that _necessity_ and _election_ may stand together, which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his arguments to prove. And first your Lordship’s own experience furnishes you with proof enough, that _horses_, _dogs_, and other brute _beasts_, do _demur_ oftentimes upon the way they are to take, the horse retiring from some strange figure that he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what else doth a man that _deliberateth_, but one while _proceed_ toward action, another while _retire_ from it, as the _hope_ of greater _good_ draws him, or the _fear_ of greater evil _drives_ him away. A _child_ may be so young as to do what it does without all _deliberation_, but that is but till it have the chance to be hurt by doing of somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod: for the actions, wherein he hath once had a check, shall be _deliberated_ on the second time. _Fools_ and _madmen_ manifestly _deliberate_ no less than the _wisest_ men, though they make not so good a _choice_, the images of things being by disease altered.