_That_ which I say _necessitateth and determinateth every action_, that his Lordship may no longer doubt of my meaning, _is the sum of all things, which being now existent, conduce and concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced_. This _concourse_ of _causes_, whereof every one is _determined_ to be such as it is by a like concourse of _former_ causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the _decree_ of God. But that the _foreknowledge_ of God should be a cause of any thing, cannot be truly said, seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge depends on the existence of the things known, and not they on it. The _influence of the stars_ is but a small part of the whole cause, consisting of the concourse of all agents. Nor does the _concourse of all causes_ make one simple _chain_ or concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains, joined together, not in all parts, but in the first link God Almighty; and consequently the whole cause of an event, doth not always depend on one single chain, but on many together. _Natural_ efficacy of _objects_ does _determine voluntary_ agents, and _necessitates_ the _will_, and consequently the _action_; but for _moral_ efficacy, I understand not what he means. _The last dictate of the judgment_, concerning the good or bad, that may follow on any action, is not properly the _whole cause_, but the last part of it, and yet may be said to produce the effect _necessarily_, in such manner as the last feather may be said to break a horse’s back, when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that one to do it. Now for his _argument_, that _if the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect, that then it follows, Adam had no true liberty_: I deny the consequence; for I make not only the _effect_, but also the _election_, of that particular effect _necessary_, inasmuch as the will itself, and each propension of a man during his deliberation, is as much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient cause, as any thing else whatsoever. As for example, it is no more necessary that fire should burn, than that a man or other creature, whose limbs be moved by fancy, should have _election_, that is _liberty_, to do what he hath a fancy to do, though it be not in his _will_ or _power_ to _choose_ his _fancy_, or choose his _election_ and _will_. This doctrine, because my Lord Bishop says he hates, I doubt had better been suppressed, as it should have been, if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer.