For a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he punish him that he so commandeth, for not doing it, it is unjust. So also, his counsels are therefore not in vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not. When God afflicted Job, he did object no sin unto him, but justified his afflicting of him, by telling him of his _power_: (Job xl. 9:) _Hast thou, saith God, an arm like mine?_ (Job xxviii. 4): _Where wert thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?_ and the like. So our Saviour, (John ix. 3) concerning the man that was born blind, said, it was not for his sin, or for his parents' sin, but that the power of God might be shown in him. _Beasts_ are subject to death and torments, yet they cannot sin: it was God’s will they should be so. _Power irresistible justifies all actions, really and properly_, in whomsoever it be found; less power does not, and because such power is in God only, he must needs be just in all actions, and we, that not comprehending his counsels, call him to the bar, commit injustice in it. I am not ignorant of the usual reply to his answer, by distinguishing between _will_ and _permission_, as that God Almighty does indeed sometimes _permit_ sins, and that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth, shall be committed, but does not _will_ it, nor _necessitate_ it. I know also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, saying, that God Almighty does indeed cause the _action_, whatsoever action it be, but not the _sinfulness_ or _irregularity_ of it, that is, the _discordance_ between the _action_ and the _law_. Such distinctions as these dazzle my understanding; I find no difference between the _will_ to have a thing done, and the _permission_ to do it, when he that permitteth can hinder it, and knows that it will be done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any difference between an _action_ and the _sin_ of that action; as for example, between the killing of Uriah, and the sin of David in killing Uriah, nor when _one_ is _cause_ both of the _action_ and of the _law_, how _another_ can be cause of the _disagreement_ between them, no more than how one man making a longer and a shorter garment, another can make the inequality that is between them. This I know; God cannot sin, because his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently, no sin; as also because whatsoever can sin, is subject to another’s law, which God is not. And therefore it is blasphemy to say, God can sin; but to say, that God can so order the world, as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such or other _distinctions_ can make it clear, that St. Paul did not think Esau’s or Pharaoh’s actions proceeded from the _will_ and _purpose_ of God, or that proceeding from his will, could not therefore without injustice be blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto