none else, frameth and maketh men’s _wills_ such as men would have them. And thus it is plain, that from the _necessity_ of a _voluntary_ action, cannot be inferred the _injustice_ of the _law_ that forbiddeth it, or the magistrate that punisheth it. Secondly, I deny that it maketh _consultations_ to be in _vain_; it is the _consultation_ that _causeth_ a man, and _necessitateth_ him to _choose_ to do one thing rather than another: so that unless a man say that that cause is in vain which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding from it. But it seemeth his Lordship reasons thus: If I must do this rather than that, I shall do this rather than that, though I consult not at all; which is a false proposition and a false consequence, and no better than this: If I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to-day. If there be a _necessity_ that an action shall be done, or that any effect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing necessarily requisite as a means to bring it to pass; and therefore when it is determined, that one thing shall be chosen before another, it is determined also for what _cause_ it shall so be chosen, which cause, for the most part, is _deliberation_ or _consultation_, and therefore consultation is not in vain, and indeed the less in vain by how much the election is more necessitated, if _more_ and _less_ had any place in _necessity_. The same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience, namely, that _admonitions_ are in _vain_; for the admonitions are parts of consultation, the admonitor being a counsellor for the time to him that is admonished. The fourth pretended inconvenience is, that _praise_, _dispraise_, _reward_, and _punishment_ will be in _vain_. To which I answer, that for _praise_ and _dispraise_, they depend not at all on the _necessity_ of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else to _praise_, but to say a thing is good? Good, I say, for me, or for somebody else, or for the state and commonwealth? And what is it to say an action is good, but to say it is as I would wish? or as another would have it, or according to the will of the state? that is to say, according to the law. Does my Lord think that no action can please me, or him, or the commonwealth, that should proceed from _necessity_? Things may be therefore _necessary_, and yet _praise-worthy_, as also _necessary_, and yet _dispraised_, and neither of them both in vain, because _praise_ and _dispraise_, and likewise _reward_ and _punishment_, do by example make and conform the will to good and evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion, that Velleius Paterculus (Lib. ii. 35) gives Cato, where he says that he was good by _nature_, _et quia aliter esse non potuit_.