In which argument I observe, first a _contradiction_; for seeing he that _maketh_ anything, in that he maketh it, maketh it to be _necessary_; it followeth that he that maketh all things, maketh all things necessarily to be: as if a workman make a garment, the garment must necessarily be; so if God make every thing, every thing must necessarily be. Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth, though we know it not, that some agents should work without deliberation (which his lordship calls _necessary_ agents) and some agents with deliberation (and those both he and I call _free_ agents) and that some agents should work, and we not know how (and their effects we both call _contingents_); but this hinders not but that he that electeth may have his _election_ necessarily determined to _one_ by _former_ causes, and that which is _contingent_, and imputed to fortune, be nevertheless _necessary_ and depend on _precedent_ necessary causes. For by _contingent_, men do not mean that which hath _no_ cause, but that which hath not for cause anything that we perceive; as for example, when a traveller meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause sufficient to produce it; but because the journey caused not the rain, nor the rain the journey, we say they were contingent one to another. And thus you see that though there be three sorts of events, _necessary_, _contingent_, and _free_, yet they may be _all_ necessary without destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe. To the first argument from reason, which is, _That if liberty be taken away, the nature and formal reason of sin is taken away_; I answer by denying the consequence: the nature of sin consisteth in this, that the _action_ done proceed from our _will_ and be against the _law_. A judge in judging whether it be sin or no, which is done against the law, looks at no higher cause of the action, than the will of the doer. Now when I say the action was _necessary_, I do not say it was done _against_ the will of the doer, but _with_ his will, and _necessarily_, because man’s will, that is every volition or act of the will and purpose of man had a _sufficient_, and therefore a _necessary_ cause, and consequently every _voluntary_ action was _necessitated_. An action therefore may be _voluntary_ and a _sin_, and nevertheless be _necessary_; and because God may afflict by a right derived from his _omnipotence_, though sin were not, and because the example of punishment on voluntary sinners, is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less frequent, for God to punish such sinners, as I have said before, is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his Lordship’s objections both out of Scripture, and from reason. ------- CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS, WHICH HIS LORDSHIP SUPPOSING MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO EVADE HIS ARGUMENTS, ARE BY HIM REMOVED.