The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 04 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
But that saying, as pretty as it is, is not true; for though Medea
saw many reasons to forbear killing her children, yet the last
dictate of her judgment was, that the present revenge on her husband
outweighed them all, and thereupon the wicked action _necessarily_
followed. Then the story of the Roman, who of two competitors, said,
one had the better reason, but the other must have the office. This
also maketh against his Lordship, for the last dictate of his
judgment that had the bestowing of the office, was this, that it was
better to take a great bribe, than reward a great merit.
Thirdly, he objects that things nearer the sense, move more
powerfully than reason; what followeth thence but this, the sense of
the present good is commonly more immediate to the action, than the
foresight of the evil consequence to come? Fourthly, whereas his
Lordship says, that do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the
death of his son than for the sin of his soul, makes nothing to the
last dictate of the understanding; but it argues plainly, that
sorrow for sin is not _voluntary_, and by consequence, that
_repentance_ proceedeth from causes.
The last part of this discourse containeth his Lordship’s opinions
about reconciling _liberty_ with the _prescience_ and _decrees_ of
God, otherwise than some _divines_ have done, against whom, he says,
he had formerly written a treatise, out of which he repeateth only
two things: one is, _That we ought not to desert a certain truth,
for not being able to comprehend the certain manner of it_. And I
say the same, as for example, that his Lordship ought not to desert
this certain truth, _that there are certain and_ necessary causes
_which make every man to_ will _what he willeth, though he do not_
yet conceive in what manner the _will_ of man is _caused_. And yet I
think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive, seeing we see
daily, that _praise_, _dispraise_, _reward_, and _punishment_,
_good_ and _evil_, sequels of men’s _actions_ retained in _memory_,
do frame and make us to the _election_ of whatsoever it be that we
elect, and that the memory of such things proceeds from the
_senses_, and _sense_ from the operation of the objects of sense,
which are external to us, and governed only by God Almighty; and by
consequence all _actions_, even of _free_ and _voluntary_ agents,
are necessary.