2. It is a proverbial saying, _inter arma silent leges_. There is a little therefore to be said concerning the laws that men are to observe one towards another in time of war, wherein every man’s being and well-being is the rule of his actions. Yet thus much the law of nature commandeth in war, that men satiate not the cruelty of their present passions, whereby in their own conscience they foresee no benefit to come. For that betrayeth not a necessity, but a disposition of the mind to war, which is against the law of nature. And in old time we read, that rapine was a trade of life, wherein nevertheless many of them that used it, did not only spare the lives of those they invaded, but left them also such things, as were necessary to preserve that life which they had given them; as namely their oxen and instruments for tillage, though they carried away all their other cattle and substance. And as the rapine itself was warranted in the law of nature, by the want of security otherwise to maintain themselves, so the exercise of cruelty was forbidden by the same law of nature, unless fear suggested anything to the contrary. For nothing but fear can justify the taking away of another’s life. And because fear can hardly be made manifest, but by some action dishonourable, that bewrayeth the conscience of one’s own weakness, all men, in whom the passion of courage or magnanimity hath been predominant, have abstained from cruelty; insomuch, that though there be in war no law, the breach whereof is injury, yet there are in war those laws, the breach whereof is dishonour. In one word, therefore, the only law of actions in war, is _honour_; and the right of war, _providence_. [Sidenote: No security without the concord of many.] 3. And seeing natural aid is necessary for defence, as mutual fear is necessary for peace, we are to consider how great aids are required for such defence, and for the causing of such mutual fear, as men may not easily adventure on one another. And first, it is evident, that the mutual aid of two or three men is of very little security. For the odds on the other side, of a man or two, giveth sufficient encouragement to an assault. And therefore before men have sufficient security in the help of one another, their number must be so great, that the odds of a few which the enemy may have, be no certain and sensible advantage. [Sidenote: That concord of many cannot be maintained without power to keep them all in awe.]