The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 04 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
4. And supposing how great a number soever of men assembled together
for their mutual defence, yet shall not the effect follow, unless
they all direct their actions to one and the same end; which
direction to one and the same end is that which, chap. XII. sect. 7,
is called _consent_. This _consent_, or concord, amongst so many
men, though it may be made by the fear of a present invader, or by
the hope of a present conquest, or booty, and endure as long as that
action endureth, nevertheless, by the diversity of judgments and
passions in so many men contending naturally for honour and
advantage one above another, it is impossible, not only that their
consent to aid each other against an enemy, but also that the peace
should last between themselves, without some mutual and common fear
to rule them.
[Sidenote: The cause why concord remaineth in a multitude of some
irrational creatures, and not of men.]
5. But contrary hereunto may be objected, the experience we have of
certain living creatures irrational, that nevertheless continually
live in such good order and government for their common benefit, and
are so free from sedition and war amongst themselves, that for
peace, profit, and defence, nothing more can be imaginable. And the
experience we have in this, is in that little creature the bee,
which is therefore reckoned amongst _animalia politica_. Why
therefore may not men, that foresee the benefit of concord,
continually maintain the same without compulsion, as well as they?
To which I answer, that amongst other living creatures, there is no
question of precedence in their own species, nor strife about
honour, or acknowledgment of one another’s wisdom, as there is
amongst men, from whence arise envy and hatred of one towards
another, and from thence sedition and war. Secondly, those living
creatures aim every one at peace and food common to them all; men
aim at dominion, superiority, and private wealth, which are distinct
in every man, and breed contention. Thirdly, those living creatures
that are without reason, have not learning enough to espy, or to
think they espy, any defect in the government; and therefore are
contented therewith. But in a multitude of men, there are always
some that think themselves wiser than the rest, and strive to alter
what they think amiss, and divers of them strive to alter divers
ways, and that causeth war. Fourthly, they want speech, and are
therefore unable to instigate one another to faction, which men want
not. Fifthly, they have no conception of right and wrong, but only
of pleasure and pain, and therefore also no censure of one another,
nor of their commander, as long as they are themselves at ease;
whereas men that make themselves judges of right and wrong, are then
least at quiet, when they are most at ease. Lastly, natural concord,
such as is amongst those creatures, is the work of God by the way of
nature; but concord amongst men is artificial, and by way of
covenant.