18. And as reason teacheth us, that a man, considered out of subjection to laws, and out of all covenants obligatory to others, is free to do and undo, and deliberate as long as he listeth, every member being obedient to the will of the whole man, that liberty being nothing else but his natural power, without which he is no better than an inanimate creature, not able to help himself; so also it teacheth us, that a body politic, of what kind soever, not subject to another, nor obliged by covenants, ought to be free, and in all actions to be assisted by the members, every one in their place, or at least, not resisted by them. For otherwise, the power of a body politic, the essence whereof is the not-resistance of the members, is none, nor a body politic of any benefit. And the same is confirmed by the use of all nations and commonwealths, wherein that man or council, which is virtually the whole, hath any absolute power over every particular member; or what nation or commonwealth is there, that hath not power and right to constitute a general in their wars? But the power of a general is absolute; and consequently there was absolute power in the commonwealth, from whom it was derived. For no person, natural or civil, can transfer unto another more power than himself hath. [Sidenote: Some principal, &c. marks of sovereignty.] 19. In every commonwealth, where particular men are deprived of their right to protect themselves, there resideth an absolute sovereignty, as I have already showed. But in what man, or in what assembly of men the same is placed, is not so manifest, as not to need some marks, whereby it may be discerned. And first, it is an infallible mark of absolute sovereignty in a man, or in an assembly of men, if there be no right in any other person, natural or civil, to punish that man, or to dissolve that assembly. For he that cannot of right be punished, cannot of right be resisted; and he that cannot of right be resisted, hath coercive power over all the rest, and thereby can frame and govern their actions at his pleasure, which is absolute sovereignty. Contrariwise, he that in a commonwealth is punishable by any, or that assembly that is dissolvable, is not sovereign. For a greater power is always required to punish and dissolve, than theirs who are punished or dissolved; and that power cannot be called sovereign, than which there is a greater. Secondly, that man or assembly, that by their own right not derived from the present right of any other, may make laws, or abrogate them at his or their pleasure, have the sovereignty absolute. For seeing the laws they make, are supposed to be made by right, the members of the commonwealth, to whom they are made, are obliged to obey them, and consequently not resist the execution of them; which not-resistance, maketh the power absolute of him that ordaineth them. It is likewise a mark of this sovereignty, to have the right original of appointing magistrates,