The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 04 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
2. In the making of a democracy, there passeth no covenant between
the sovereign, and any subject. For while the democracy is a making,
there is no sovereign with whom to contract. For it cannot be
imagined, that the multitude should contract with itself, or with
any one man, or number of men, parcel of itself, to make itself
sovereign; nor that a multitude, considered as one aggregate, can
give itself anything which before it had not. Seeing then that
sovereignty democratical is not conferred by the covenant of any
multitude, which supposeth union and sovereignty already made, it
resteth, that the same be conferred by the particular covenants of
every several man; that is to say, every man with every man, for and
in consideration of the benefit of his own peace and defence,
covenanteth to stand to and obey whatsoever the major part of their
whole number, or the major part of such a number of them, as shall
be pleased to assemble at a certain time and place, shall determine
and command. And this is that which giveth being to a democracy,
wherein the sovereign assembly was called of the Greeks, by the name
of _Demus_, that is, the people, from whence cometh democracy. So
that, where to the supreme and independent court, every man may come
that will, and give his vote, there the sovereign is called the
people.
[Sidenote: The sovereign, &c. cannot, &c. do injury, &c.]
3. Out of this that hath been said, may readily be drawn, that
whatsoever the people doth to any one particular member or subject
of the commonwealth, the same by him ought not to be styled injury.
For first, injury, by the definition, Part I. chap. III. sect. 2, is
breach of covenant; but covenants, as hath been said in the
precedent section, there passed none from the people to any private
man; and consequently it, to wit, the people, can do him no injury.
Secondly, how unjust soever the action be, that this sovereign
_demus_ shall do, is done by the will of every particular man
subject to him, who are therefore guilty of the same. If therefore
they style it _injury_, they but accuse themselves. And it is
against reason for the same man, both to do and complain; implying
this contradiction, that whereas he first ratified the people’s acts
in general, he now disalloweth the same of them in particular. It is
therefore said truly, _volenti non fit injuria_. Nevertheless
nothing doth hinder, but that divers actions done by the people, may
be unjust before God Almighty, as breaches of the laws of nature.
[Sidenote: The faults of the sovereign people, &c.]