from the authority of the people, he receiveth it not from the people his subjects, but from the people his sovereign. And further, though in the election of a king for his life, the people grant him the exercise of their sovereignty for that time; yet if they see cause, they may recall the same before the time. As a prince that conferreth an office for life, may nevertheless, upon suspicion of abuse thereof, recall it at his pleasure; inasmuch as offices that require labour and care, are understood to pass from him that giveth them, as _onera_, _burthens_, to them that have them; the recalling whereof are therefore not _injury_, but _favour_. Nevertheless, if in making an elective king, with intention to reserve the sovereignty, they reserve not a power at certain known and determined times and places to assemble themselves, the reservation of their sovereignty is of no effect, inasmuch as no man is bound to stand to the decrees and determinations of those that assemble themselves without the sovereign authority. [Sidenote: A conditional king, &c.] 10. In the former section is showed, that elective kings that exercise their sovereignty for a time, which determines with their life, either are subjects, or not sovereigns; and that it is, when the people in election of them, reserve unto themselves the right of assembling at certain times and places limited and made known; or else absolute sovereigns, to dispose of the succession at their pleasure, and that is, when the people in their election have declared no time nor place of their meeting, or have left it to the power of the elected king, to assemble and dissolve them at such times, as he himself shall think good. There is another kind of limitation of time, to him that shall be elected to use the sovereign power, which whether it hath been practised anywhere, or not, I know not, but it may be imagined, and hath been objected against the rigour of sovereign power; and it is this, that the people transfer their sovereignty upon conditions. As for example, for so long as he shall observe such and such laws, as they then prescribe him. And here as before in elected kings, the question is to be made, whether in the electing of such a sovereign, they reserved to themselves a right of assembling at times and places limited and known, or not; if not, then is the sovereignty of the people dissolved, and they have neither power to judge of the breach of the conditions given him, nor to command any forces for the deposing of him, whom on that condition they had set up, but are in the estate of war amongst themselves, as they were before they made themselves a democracy: and consequently, if he that is elected by the advantage of the possession he hath of the public means, be able to compel them to unity and obedience, he hath not only the right of nature to warrant him, but the law of nature to oblige him thereunto. But if in electing him, they reserved to themselves a