If the Bishop had considered the cogitations of his own mind, not then when he disputeth, but then when he followed those businesses which he calleth trifles, he would have found them the very same which he here mentioneth; saving instead of _beating_, (because he is exempt from that), he is to put _in damage_. For, setting aside the discourse of the tongue in words of general signification, the ideas of our minds are the same with those of other living creatures, created from visible, audible, and other sensible objects to the eyes and other organs of sense, as their’s are. For as the objects of sense are all individual, that is, singular, so are all the fancies proceeding from their operations; and men reason not but in words of universal signification, uttered or tacitly thought on. But perhaps he thinketh remembrance of words to be the ideas of those things which the words signify; and that all fancies are not effected by the operation of objects upon the organs of our senses. But to rectify him in those points is greater labour (unless he had better principles) than I am willing, or have at this time leisure, to undergo. Lastly, whereas he says, “if their individual actions were absolutely necessary, fear or hope could not alter them”: that is true. For it is fear and hope, that makes them necessarily what they are. NO. XV. [Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] _J. D._ “Thirdly, let this opinion be once radicated in the minds of men, that there is no true liberty, and that all things come to pass inevitably, and it will utterly destroy the study of piety. Who will bewail his sins with tears? What will become of that grief, that zeal, that indignation, that holy revenge, which the Apostle speaks of, if men be once thoroughly persuaded that they could not shun what they did? A man may grieve for that which he could not help; but he will never be brought to bewail that as his own fault, which flowed not from his own error, but from antecedent necessity. Who will be careful or solicitous to perform obedience, that believeth there are inevitable bounds and limits set to all his devotions, which he can neither go beyond, nor come short of? To what end shall he pray God to avert those evils which are inevitable, or to confer those favours which are impossible? We indeed know not what good or evil shall happen to us: but this we know, that if all things be necessary, our devotions and endeavours cannot alter that which must be. In a word, the only reason why those persons, who tread in this path of fatal destiny, do sometimes pray, or repent, or serve God, is because the light of nature, and the strength of reason, and the evidence of Scripture, do for that present transport them from their ill-chosen grounds, and expel those stoical fancies out of their heads. A complete Stoic can neither pray, nor repent, nor serve God to any purpose. Either allow liberty, or destroy Church as well as