argueth a delight of God in the torments of his creatures, is even as true, as that it was pity and commiseration in the dogs that made them lick the sores of Lazarus. Or how doth the opinion of necessity “destroy the justice of God, or make him to punish the creatures for that which was his own act”? If all afflictions be punishments, for whose act are all other creatures punished which cannot sin? Why may not God make the affliction, both of those men that he hath elected, and also of those whom he hath reprobated, the necessary causes of the conversion of those he hath elected; their own afflictions serving therein as chastisements, and the afflictions of the rest as examples? But he may perhaps think it no injustice to punish the creatures that cannot sin with temporary punishments, when nevertheless it would be injustice to torment the same creatures eternally. This may be somewhat to meekness and cruelty, but nothing at all to justice and injustice: for in punishing the innocent, the injustice is equal, though the punishments be unequal. And what cruelty can be greater than that which may be inferred from this opinion of the Bishop; that God doth torment eternally, and with the extremest degree of torment, all those men which have sinned, that is to say, all mankind from the creation to the end of the world which have not believed in Jesus Christ, whereof very few, in respect of the multitude of others, have so much as heard of his name; and this, when faith in Christ is the gift of God himself, and the hearts of all men in his hands to frame them to the belief of whatsoever he will have them to believe? He hath no reason therefore, for his part, to tax any opinion, for ascribing to God either cruelty or injustice. Or how doth it “destroy the power of God, or make him to be the author of all the defects and evils which are in the world”? First, he seemeth not to understand what _author_ signifies. _Author_, is he which owneth an action, or giveth a warrant to do it. Do I say, that any man hath in the Scripture, which is all the warrant we have from God for any action whatsoever, a warrant to commit theft, murder, or any other sin? Does the opinion of necessity infer that there is such a warrant in the Scripture? Perhaps he will say, no, but that this opinion makes him the cause of sin. But does not the Bishop think him the cause of all actions? And are not sins of commission actions? Is murder no action? And does not God himself say, _non est malum in civitate quod ego non feci_; and was murder not one of those evils? Whether it were or not, I say no more but that God is the cause, not the author, of all actions and motions. Whether sin be the action, or the defect, or the irregularity, I mean not to dispute. Nevertheless I am of opinion, that the distinction of _causes_ into _efficient_ and _deficient_ is _bohu_, and signifies nothing.