_T. H._ To the fifth argument from reason, which is, that if liberty be taken away, the nature and formal reason of sin is taken away, I answer by denying the consequence. The nature of sin consisteth in this, that the action done proceed from our will, and be against the law. A judge, in judging whether it be sin or not which is done against the law, looks at no higher cause of the action than the will of the doer. Now when I say the action was necessary, I do not say it was done against the will of the doer, but with his will, and so necessarily; because man’s will, that is, every act of the will, and purpose of man had a sufficient, and therefore a necessary cause, and consequently every voluntary action was necessitated. An action therefore may be voluntary and a sin, and nevertheless be necessary. And God may afflict by right derived from his omnipotency, though sin were not. And the example of punishment on voluntary sinners, is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less frequent; for God to punish such sinners, as I have shewed before, is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his objections, both out of Scripture and reason. [Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] _J. D._ “_Scis tu simulare cupressum._ _Quid hoc?_” It was shrewd counsel which Alcibiades gave to Themistocles, when he was busy about his accounts to the state; that he should rather study how to make no accounts. So it seems T. H. thinks it a more compendious way, to baulk an argument, than to satisfy it. And if he can produce a Rowland against an Oliver, if he can urge a reason against a reason, he thinks he hath quitted himself fairly. But it will not serve his turn. And that he may not complain of misunderstanding it, as those who have a politic deafness to hear nothing but what liketh them, I will first reduce mine argument into form, and then weigh what he saith in answer, or rather in opposition to it. (_a_) That opinion which takes away the formal reason of sin, and by consequence, sin itself, is not to be approved; this is clear, because both reason and religion, nature and Scripture, do prove, and the whole world confesseth, that there is sin. But this opinion, of the necessity of all things by reason of a conflux of second causes, ordered and determined by the first cause, doth take away the very formal reason of sin. This is proved thus. That which makes sin itself to be good, and just, and lawful, takes away the formal cause, and destroys the essence of sin; for if sin be good, and just, and lawful, it is no more evil, it is no sin, no anomy. But this opinion of the necessity of all things, makes sin to be very good, and just, and lawful; for nothing can flow essentially by way of physical determination from the first cause, which is the law and rule of goodness and justice, but that which is good, and just, and lawful. But this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially by way of physical determination from the first cause, as appears in T. H.’s whole